Chasing Transsion: The Crisis Behind Chinese Companies’ Global Expansion as Africa’s “Smartphone King” Loses Steam

Transsion headquarters in Shenzhen

WENG Yukai (翁钰开)

1 Introduction

In May 2024, the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) conducted a raid on Transsion’s office in Nairobi, allegedly for evading taxes amounting to as much as 400 billion Kenyan shillings.[1] It was evident that Transsion’s legal department was caught unprepared, lacking both a rapid litigation response and effective negotiation with local authorities.[2]

This was the first time people saw the once-invincible Africa’s “Smartphone King” caught off guard. The incident was not a spur-of-the-moment decision by the authorities; in fact, it reflects the fact that China-Africa economic and trade cooperation has entered a new era in which contradictions can no longer be concealed. Taking Transsion as a case study, this post argues that the company’s experience of tax audits and intellectual property licensing disputes in multiple African countries starkly reveals how differences across African legal and regulatory systems can turn what might seem like a market-expansion opportunity into an ongoing compliance burden. The long-term competitiveness of Chinese enterprises in Africa depends not simply on entering markets, but on their ability to foresee legal and regulatory risks, build sufficient in-house legal capacity, and navigate fragmented regulatory environments and increasingly complex compliance demands.

First, this post will outline the macro landscape of China-Africa economic and trade cooperation, especially in digital infrastructure and consumer electronics, providing the contextual background for Transsion’s strategic entry. Second, it will examine differences across African legal and regulatory environments and explain how those differences affect tax and intellectual property compliance. Third, it will conduct a detailed compliance case study of Transsion, examining the severe tax audits it faces in countries such as Kenya and the intellectual property licensing disputes encountered globally, demonstrating how increasing compliance burdens underpin its business success. Finally, it will summarize investment protection lessons for Chinese companies operating in Africa, arguing for a shift beyond the low-cost model towards embedding compliance as a core capability. Chinese enterprises must build robust in-house legal and tax functions, adopt tiered IP and data strategies, integrate ESG for community legitimacy, and design fit-for-purpose dispute-resolution architecture tailored to African jurisdictions.

2 Transsion: Riding the Waves of Thriving China-Africa Trade

China is the largest developing country in the world, and Africa is the continent with the largest concentration of developing countries.[3] At the 2024 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Beijing Summit, Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, proposed the implementation of the “China-Africa Quality Enhancement Program [Zhong Fei Zhiliang Tisheng Jihua 中非质量提升计划].”[4] He expressed China’s willingness to negotiate and sign a framework agreement on joint economic partnership with African countries, aiming to provide long-term, stable, and predictable institutional guarantees for China-Africa trade and investment.[5]

Under the continuous and in-depth advancement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China-Africa trade relations have grown increasingly close. Chinese enterprises, represented by Transsion, are actively investing in the African market with great enthusiasm and innovative models.[6] China has become Africa’s largest infrastructure investor and trading partner.[7] By the end of 2022, China’s direct investment stock in Africa exceeded 40 billion US dollars,[8] covering countries such as Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia,[9] focusing on infrastructure, manufacturing, digital economy, and green energy.[10] As of June 2024, the China-Africa Development Fund and the China-Africa Capacity Cooperation Fund have jointly driven investments exceeding 48 billion US dollars,[11] establishing multiple economic and trade zones, creating millions of local jobs,[12] and advancing China-Africa cooperation toward higher quality and diversification.[13]

Countries that signed agreements with China to join its Belt and Road Initiative[14]

In this context, Transsion made a strategic and timely entry into the African continent. China’s massive investment in infrastructure across Africa has also promoted a breakthrough in China-Africa trade, shifting from traditional resource and infrastructure dimensions to digital infrastructure and consumer electronics.[15] As China promotes the construction of the Digital Silk Road, it collaborates with telecommunications equipment manufacturers to lead the deployment of network infrastructure in Africa,[16] prioritizing “digital connectivity” and “export of information infrastructure,” aiming to deepen digital economic ties with Africa through the promotion of mobile payments, digital finance, and communication networks.[17] The African smartphone market, projected to reach approximately 30.63 billion USD in 2024 and grow to about 52.99 billion USD by 2033,[18] is being driven by a growing base of young users who are eager for internet-enabled devices and increasingly sensitive to digital experiences like social networking, video, and financial services.[19]

Leveraging the momentum of the “Digital Silk Road” and the wave of infrastructure development in African nations, Transsion’s positioning not only meets African consumers’ demand for practical, affordable, and localized phones but also rides the fast train of China’s export of digital solutions, connection services, and communication links.[20] As a company primarily selling phones in Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, Transsion did not attempt to compete head-to-head with high-end brands at the top but instead “quietly making a fortune [Men Sheng Fa Da Cai 闷声发大财],”[21] deeply covering the mid-to-low-end markets in developing countries that have modest performance requirements but are sensitive to price and require localized services.[22] In 2024, the company’s global mobile phone market share reached 14.0%, ranking third among global mobile phone manufacturers, with a smartphone market share of 8.7%, ranking fourth globally.[23] Transsion’s market share in Africa has remained stable above 40% for many years, and by Q3 2023, its shipments in the African smartphone market accounted for about 48%.[24]

Meanwhile, brands under Transsion such as Tecno, Infinix, and Itel target the digital innovation gap in the African market, providing products and services tailored to user needs.[25] Some African countries are experiencing strong economic growth, and the expanding middle class has driven huge demand for smartphones. It is estimated that by 2030, the smartphone penetration rate in Sub-Saharan Africa will reach nearly 87%.[26] With features like “multi-card slots,” “long battery life,” “optimized camera for dark skin tones,” and “support for local language input,”[27] they have successfully bridged the gap with users, repeatedly ranking among the “Top 100 Most Loved Brands by African Consumers” and being recognized by consumers as Africa’s undisputed “Smartphone King.”[28]

Recent scholarship offers a useful way to understand why this localization model has proved so durable. In The Transsion Approach: Translating Chinese Mobile Technology in Africa, Miao Lu, drawing on fieldwork in China and Ghana, describes Transsion’s design, marketing, and repair practices as a multilayered process of “technology translation” and uses the metaphor of “deep ploughing” to characterize its rural and lower-income-oriented approach. This perspective suggests that Transsion’s advantage rests on more than low prices.  It is embedded in product design, distribution, repair, and the adaptation of technology to local everyday life. Lu also cautions that the same model can marginalize smaller local players and deepen dependence on a regional technology platform, adding a governance dimension to Transsion’s commercial success.[29]

More recent market data also complicate a simple narrative of decline. Omdia reported that in the first quarter of 2026 Transsion retained the top position in Africa with a 47% smartphone shipment share and 4% year-on-year growth. At the same time, sub-US$200 devices still accounted for 75% of African shipments, while rising memory costs, currency volatility, and affordability pressures were forcing vendors to reprice entry-level products. Transsion therefore remains commercially strong in its core African market, but the cost structure supporting its traditional low-price model has become more fragile.[30]

However, legal risks have gained attention as Chinese investment in Africa has expanded.[31] The scale of that investment makes jurisdictional differences increasingly consequential.[32] For Transsion, the key challenge is not a single “African” legal environment but the differences among the jurisdictions in which it operates.[33] Rules concerning intellectual property, foreign investment, labor, foreign exchange, and tax can vary materially from one market to another.[34] Enforcement uncertainty can compound those differences.[35] It is therefore difficult to transfer a compliance model developed for one country directly to another.[36] The following section focuses only on the jurisdictional differences most relevant to Transsion’s tax and IP exposure.

3 Behind the Curtain: Differences Across African Legal and Regulatory Systems

African jurisdictions do not share a single legal system.[37] Depending on the country, statutory rules may interact with customary law[38] and other dispute-resolution mechanisms to different degrees.[39] IP institutions[40] and enforcement capacity likewise vary across jurisdictions.[41] For a company such as Transsion, operating across numerous African markets, the practical problem is therefore not that African law is uniformly weak, but that administrative procedures, enforcement capacity, and available remedies differ from market to market.[42]

Some of these differences reflect distinct colonial legal inheritances.[43] The incorporation of customary law also developed differently across systems.[44] These historical patterns help explain the diversity of legal structures.[45] Their present compliance significance, however, lies less in this history than in the continuing development of local-content and other sector-specific rules.[46] Regulatory change also occurs at different speeds across jurisdictions.[47]

IP risk illustrates the point. Registration timelines[48] and enforcement capacity[49] differ across jurisdictions, while institutional resources for innovation remain uneven.[50] Rights enforcement has also developed unevenly in digital contexts.[51] These differences can affect both the protection of a company’s own rights and its incentives to invest in R&D.[52] For Transsion, IP compliance therefore has to be assessed market by market rather than on the assumption that one regional enforcement pattern will apply throughout Africa.

Tax compliance presents a similar problem. African jurisdictions differ in their reliance on import duties and VAT.[53] Broader tax-collection structures also vary.[54] Customs valuation and transfer-pricing practices differ across markets.[55] Tax enforcement is also intensifying in some jurisdictions,[56] while transparency and accountability reforms are developing unevenly.[57] For a consumer-electronics company with high import volumes and related-party transactions, those differences can materially affect cost and exposure. The relevant risk is therefore country-specific: how a particular tax authority values imports, reviews related-party pricing, and responds to policy or fiscal changes.

For Transsion, these cross-jurisdictional differences turn expansion into a compliance-management problem: legal and tax assumptions that work in one market may not transfer to another. Product localization therefore needs to be matched by jurisdiction-specific legal, tax, and IP capacity.

4 Compliance Under Pressure: Transsion as a Case Study of Chinese Firms Navigating Compliance Risks in Africa

In May 2025, Transsion released its latest annual report, revealing a 25.45% decline in operating revenue in the first quarter of 2025 and a 69.87% decrease in net profit, meaning its profitability was nearly 70% lower than the same period last year.[58] The news spread like a thunderclap in China, and the signs of a slowdown for Africa’s “Smartphone King,” which once swept the African consumer market, are not hard to find. Like most Chinese enterprises entering the African market through the BRI and price advantages,[59] Transsion now faces the hidden concerns brought by its expanding business scale and the need to navigate Africa’s complex compliance environment.

Subsequent company filings make the picture more nuanced. For full-year 2025, Transsion’s revenue fell 4.55% year on year to RMB 65.59 billion, while net profit attributable to shareholders fell 53.49% to RMB 2.58 billion. The company attributed the decline principally to market competition, higher prices for storage and other components, and increased R&D and sales expenses. Yet its African business remained comparatively resilient: revenue from Africa rose 9.90% to RMB 24.97 billion, although gross margin in the region fell by 3.66 percentage points.[60] The first quarter of 2026 then showed a clear rebound, with revenue rising 24.58% year on year to RMB 16.20 billion and attributable net profit rising 42.90% to RMB 700.36 million; R&D investment also increased 31.32%.[61]

Transsion quarterly revenue and net profit changes [62]

As mentioned earlier, among many African countries, increasing tax scrutiny of multinational corporations is becoming a common trend, and Transsion, due to its leading position in the African market and its large-scale “Import→Production→Sales” chain,[63] naturally becomes a typical target of African authorities. In May 2024, there were reports that KRA had conducted a surprise inspection at Transsion’s office in Nairobi.[64] KRA stated that it has planned an in-depth audit of Transsion’s suspected tax evasion involving over 3 billion US dollars in areas such as import declarations, customs valuation, VAT payments, and transfer pricing of related-party transactions,[65] an amount that could constitute a significant proportion of Kenya’s previous budget revenue.[66] This action caused considerable shock locally and was seen as the beginning of Kenya’s tax authorities strengthening supervision over the telecommunications and consumer electronics industries.[67] Transsion is also accused of underreporting the value of imported goods, lowering profits through related-party transactions, and reducing taxable bases to lessen customs duties and VAT burdens.[68] Although these allegations have not yet been fully confirmed, they sufficiently demonstrate that as a market leader, Transsion’s scale and import volume inevitably make it a key focus of tax authorities’ monitoring.

Transsion’s Kenya audit also sits within a broader trend of stronger BEPS and transfer-pricing enforcement.[69] Enforcement conditions nevertheless differ across African jurisdictions; capacity constraints and administrative discretion can make some audits less predictable.[70] Recent disputes in Niger[71] and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)[72] illustrate how fiscal issues can take different forms in different markets. At the same time, ATAF-supported initiatives are strengthening transfer-pricing audits[73] and broader tax administration capacity.[74] For Chinese companies, the practical implication is to treat cross-border related-party transactions as a jurisdiction-specific compliance issue rather than assume a uniform regional approach.

Faced with increasing legal regulation pressures from African countries, unlike Western multinational companies with mature legal teams and long-term cross-border audit experience, many rapidly expanding Chinese enterprises, especially those adopting a “Fast deployment & Low Cost & Flexible model” in Africa,[75] often lack sufficient compliance investment.[76] During their entry into the African market, their priority is on channel development, market promotion, and cost control,[77] while their legal and tax teams may only serve as emergency supplements, lacking proactive strategic planning. This puts them at a disadvantage when facing unexpected audits, geopolitical disputes, or sudden legal and policy changes.[78] Taking Transsion as an example, after collecting and analyzing 99 news articles from the company’s official website since January 13, 2014, through frequency analysis,[79] it can be seen that Transsion’s main publicity and work focus remains on corporate image, social welfare, and technological innovation, with ZERO news coverage related to overseas compliance efforts.

No. Theme Category Quantity Proportion
1 Awards & Rankings 34 34.3%
2 Social Responsibility / Public Welfare (CSR / Philanthropy) 17 17.2%
3 Partnerships & Strategic Collaborations 10 10.1%
4 Product & Technology Innovation 12 12.1%
5 Market & Business Expansion 6 6.1%
6 Manufacturing & Expansion 4 4.0%
7 Standards & Certifications 2 2.0%
8 Diplomacy & Official Visits 2 2.0%
9 Events & Conferences 1 1.0%
10 Research & Labs 2 2.0%
11 Other / Unclassified 9 9.1%

Classification statistics of all news on Transsion’ official website

These differences translate into recurring compliance costs. For Transsion’s multi-entity procurement, assembly, and distribution network, customs valuation and tax-risk models need to be calibrated by jurisdiction.[80] Tariffs, product classifications, and valuation rules can change.[81] In Kenya, for example, KRA may use alternative valuation methods where declared values are in doubt.[82] Audit discretion can make late-stage responses costly.[83] Broader tax reforms can also increase compliance demands,[84] making reliable local legal and tax support important.[85] Real-time monitoring is therefore part of the operating model, not merely an emergency response.

Intellectual property presents a different but related challenge. Any assumption that Transsion’s African markets would remain relatively low-risk for patent enforcement has become increasingly difficult to sustain.[86] More broadly,  Standard Essential Patent (SEP) litigation has become increasingly multi-jurisdictional.[87] Since 2024, Qualcomm has sued Transsion over cellular patents[88] across several jurisdictions.[89] Philips also brought Advanced Audio Coding (AAC) and Unified Speech and Audio Coding (USAC) SEP claims in India[90] before settling in 2025.[91] Qualcomm has separately pursued Transsion at the Unified Patent Court (UPC).[92] Other licensors, including Huawei, NEC, JVC, and Sun Patent Trust, have pursued High Efficiency Video Coding (HEVC)-related enforcement actions against Transsion. Those actions have settled.  [93]

By early 2026, that geographic assumption had changed. SEP enforcement against Transsion had moved directly into African courts, including Nigeria, Morocco, and South Africa, while parallel actions expanded across Latin America and Southeast Asia. This development undercuts any strategy premised on treating African markets as uniformly low-enforcement jurisdictions. Even where enforcement has historically been less frequent, patent holders can select jurisdictions with meaningful remedies and use parallel proceedings to increase licensing pressure.[94] For Transsion, the risk is not merely a damages award in India or Europe, but disruption to pricing, distribution, and product strategy across markets where low margins are central to the business model.[95]

The scale and sequencing of Ericsson’s campaign are significant. A first wave in November 2025 targeted Brazil, India, Nigeria, and three UPC venues; the December wave added Morocco, Indonesia, and Colombia; and the January 2026 wave added South Africa, Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines. Several of these actions were reported as the first publicly known major SEP suits in the relevant jurisdictions. The enforcement strategy therefore appears to test courts in markets where Transsion has substantial exposure, making jurisdictional differences part of the patent holder’s enforcement architecture rather than a predictable shield for the implementer.[96]

Transsion’s response also changed. In March 2026, it filed a patent infringement action against Ericsson in the UPC’s Lisbon Local Division over EP 4 123 910, the first publicly known patent infringement complaint brought by Transsion itself. This move suggests a shift from a largely defensive posture in licensing disputes toward using its own patent portfolio as bargaining leverage in a global dispute.[97]

Institutional capacity and procedural speed still vary by jurisdiction, and some African IP systems face resource constraints.[98] Yet the 2025-26 litigation wave makes it difficult to treat those constraints as a general barrier to SEP enforcement. The Morocco injunction discussed below shows that at least some African courts can issue commercially significant relief. The relevant risk is therefore jurisdictional divergence, not a continent-wide absence of enforcement.

The experiment soon produced a concrete African remedy. On July 6, 2026, the Casablanca Commercial Court ordered Tecno Mobile Limited and Itel Mobility Limited to stop marketing smartphones in Morocco that infringed Ericsson patents; the ruling was reported as Africa’s first SEP injunction.[99] Two days later, Ericsson announced that the parties had settled their global dispute through a multi-year global patent cross-license and would withdraw all pending lawsuits and administrative proceedings.[100] This shows that African courts can become active SEP venues, while Transsion’s own portfolio can form part of the bargaining structure leading to a cross-license.

Transsion’s own 2025 annual report now expressly identifies “communication patent licensing risk,” acknowledging that implementing third-party SEPs may require royalty payments, may lead to litigation, and may create cost increases that cannot necessarily be passed on through higher product prices.[101] That broader exposure was already visible in April 2026, when InterDigital announced that a Brazilian court had granted a preliminary injunction preventing Transsion from selling 5G-compliant devices based on two InterDigital 5G patents and had found InterDigital’s licensing offer to be FRAND. Nor did the Ericsson settlement end the broader exposure. On July 1, 2026, the Delhi High Court ordered Transsion to provide pro tem security in InterDigital’s pending SEP suits concerning 3G, 4G, 5G, and HEVC technologies.[102] SEP licensing has therefore become a recurring operating issue rather than a one-off dispute with a single licensor.

Overall, Transsion’s tax and patent disputes show how commercial scale can magnify legal exposure. The Kenya allegations require country-specific customs and transfer-pricing controls, while SEP disputes require coordinated licensing and litigation strategies across multiple jurisdictions. The central lesson is not that African legal systems are uniformly weak or fragmented, but that differences in rules, institutions, and enforcement make a one-size-fits-all compliance model unreliable. Legal, tax, and IP capability therefore has to develop alongside market expansion rather than operate as an after-the-fact response.

5 Beyond the Low-Cost Model: Investment Protection Lessons Chinese Companies Must Learn

The success of Chinese companies in the African market has moved beyond the initial phase of “crossing the river by touching the stones [Mo Zhe Shi Tou Guo He 摸着石头过河],”[103] and entered a new stage of rapid competitive growth. Improving the quality of corporate legal teams should be regarded as a panacea not only for Transsion but also for most Chinese enterprises operating in Africa. Africa deserves, as much as other regions—or perhaps even more so—the establishment of a professional legal team to thoroughly research the laws and regulations of the target market and ensure that every aspect of the company, from R&D to operations, complies with local legal requirements.[104] The legal department must conduct regular internal audits and compliance training to raise employees’ compliance awareness and integrate compliance concepts into the corporate culture.[105] Simultaneously, strengthening cooperation with internationally renowned law firms and consulting agencies is crucial to obtaining the latest legal information and policy developments, providing professional support for the company’s compliance decisions.[106]

The most internationally favored but possibly unachievable alternative remains intellectual property protection. The case of Transsion demonstrates that as companies shift their focus from feature phones and low-end smartphones to the mid-to-high-end market, their overlap with tech giants like Qualcomm and Huawei in the chip and patent fields increases significantly, leading to a substantial rise in patent litigation risks. Companies in Africa need to adopt a tiered intellectual property strategy, proactively monitoring trademark squatting risks in target markets and checking for pre-existing trademark registrations through WIPO databases or official channels of target country trademark offices.[107] For target markets that the business may reach, overseas trademark registration should be completed as early as possible.[108] However, a more effective approach is to strengthen the research and development of differentiated products, creating unique innovation channels specific to Africa, and fundamentally preventing patent disputes.[109]

Recent developments also suggest that a tiered intellectual property strategy needs to be more specific for standardized technologies. Trademark registration and differentiated R&D remain useful, but they do not solve exposure to cellular and video-codec SEPs embedded in industry standards. For products implementing 3G, 4G, 5G, HEVC, or similar standards, companies need a portfolio-level SEP function that maps the standards implemented by each product, models royalty exposure in pricing, documents willingness and counteroffers during FRAND negotiations, coordinates litigation across jurisdictions, and develops an affirmative patent portfolio capable of supporting counterclaims and cross-licensing. Transsion’s 2026 action against Ericsson and the eventual global cross-license illustrate how IP assets can operate as negotiation tools as well as defensive rights.[110]

ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) has become an international rule of the game that Chinese companies must face when expanding into Africa. Empirical research has shown that actively fulfilling social responsibility can significantly win community trust and operational legitimacy.[111] Chinese companies in Africa need to comply with local labor laws, guarantee the wages and benefits of local employees, and increase the proportion of local employment.[112] Regularly disclosing environmental and social responsibility reports can win long-term trust through transparent communication and build a community of shared interests and emotions.[113] In terms of tax compliance, companies must attach importance to timely declaration of tax obligations, establish a sound tax compliance management system, and complete the declaration of all tax types on time to avoid high fines or even criminal liability due to delayed or missed declarations.[114]

In the event of a dispute, it is recommended that companies clearly define dispute resolution clauses in investment agreements and cooperation contracts, prioritizing the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) or well-known local arbitration institutions in Africa or elsewhere, and agreeing to apply Chinese law or another neutral and commercially recognized governing law agreed upon by the parties, to avoid conflicts of applicable law.[115] Within the framework of the BRI and BRICS, international commercial courts and integrated one-stop dispute resolution mechanisms encompassing litigation, arbitration, and mediation can be considered to overcome the either/or logical barriers to replacing traditional dispute resolution mechanisms.[116] 

6 Conclusion: To Ride the Waves of Africa’s Emerging Markets

During the Two Sessions in 2025, Xi Jinping made an ambitious call: “Promote the development of new quality productive forces, enabling China to always ride the waves [Nong Chao Er 弄潮儿] in the modern economic tide.”[118] However, the case of Transsion warns us that on the highly heterogeneous and dynamically changing African continent, any business model based on low cost but weak compliance may be unstable, and its potential vulnerabilities will be exposed as the enterprise scales up or external environments change.

At a more fundamental level, Transsion’s predicament serves as a “truth-revealing mirror [Zhao Yao Jing 照妖镜],” reflecting the shortcomings in global governance capabilities of many rapidly expanding Chinese enterprises. Compared to Western multinational corporations with decades or even a century of global experience, some Chinese enterprises, in their “going out” process, often focus on market expansion, channel development, and cost control, while viewing legal, tax, and intellectual property compliance functions as supportive or post-remediation cost centers. This model becomes powerless when faced with the diverse tax systems of African countries, fluctuating customs policies, and the global hunt by international patent giants.

Looking ahead, the outbound expansion model of Chinese enterprises urgently requires a profound compliance transformation. Transsion’s story is far from over. Its challenges and choices will become the path for all Chinese enterprises aspiring to go global. The chapter of China-Africa cooperation is shifting to a new stage of high-quality, sustainable development. In this historic transformation, only those enterprises that deeply integrate business wisdom with compliance resilience, and advance market expansion with risk prevention simultaneously, can truly cycle through challenges in Africa, and “ride the waves” of global market in the new era.

The developments through August 2026 sharpen the argument of this post. Transsion’s 2026 first-quarter financial rebound and 47% African shipment share show that legal exposure does not automatically translate into immediate commercial decline. The more consequential change is institutional, SEP enforcement has followed Transsion into African and other Global South jurisdictions, while Transsion has begun asserting its own portfolio and negotiating cross-licenses. Its next phase will therefore test whether the legal and IP infrastructure of a Chinese emerging-market multinational can scale at the same speed as the commercial ecosystem that made it successful.

Acknowledgements

The author [STL 3L student in the fall of 2026] is deeply grateful to Professor Susan Finder for her invaluable guidance and support throughout the writing process, from topic selection to detailed revisions. The author also wishes to thank Mr. H for sharing his frontline experience and legal insights regarding Transsion’s operations in Africa. Due to confidentiality obligations with his organization, he is acknowledged here anonymously.

  1. Hillary Keverenge, Transsion under fire for alleged tax evasion in Kenya, Android Kenya (May 23, 2024), https://androidkenya.com/2024/05/transsion-tecno-infinix-alleged-tax-evasion/. ↑
  2. Id. ↑
  3. Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan (中华人民共和国国务院) [State Council of the People’s Republic of China], Xin Shidai de Zhong-Fei Hezuo Baipishu (新时代的中非合作白皮书) [White Paper on China-Africa Cooperation in the New Era], Zhongguo Zhengfu Wang (中国政府网) [Gov.cn] (Nov. 26, 2021), https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2021-11/26/content_5653540.htm. ↑
  4. Xi Jinping (习近平), Xi Jinping Chuxi Zhong-Fei Hezuo Luntan Beijing Fenghui Kaimushi Bing Fabiao Zhuzhi Jianghua (习近平出席中非合作论坛北京峰会开幕式并发表主旨讲话) [Xi Jinping Attends Opening Ceremony of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Summit and Delivers Keynote Speech], Zhongguo Zhengfu Wang (中国政府网) [Gov.cn] (Sept. 2024), https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202409/content_6972519.htm. ↑
  5. Id. ↑
  6. Nagla’a El-Hodiri, China’s Foreign Investments Significantly Outpace the United States. What does that mean?, U.S.Government Accountability Office (Oct. 16, 2024), https://www.gao.gov/blog/chinas-foreign-investments-significantly-outpace-united-states.-what-does-mean. ↑
  7. Chido Munyati, Understanding evolving China-Africa economic relations, World Economic Forum (June 25, 2024), https://www.weforum.org/stories/2024/06/why-strong-regional-value-chains-will-be-vital-to-the-next-chapter-of-china-and-africas-economic-relationship/. ↑
  8. China-Africa investment cooperation promotes Africa’s industrialization, The State Council (Aug. 24, 2024), https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202408/24/content_WS66c925aec6d0868f4e8ea360.html. ↑
  9. Ficawoyi Donou-Adonsou & Sokchea Lim, On the Importance of Chinese Investment in Africa, 8 Rev. Dev. Fin. 63, 73 (2018). ↑
  10. Id. ↑
  11. Tuijin “Yidai Yilu” Jianshe Gongzuo Lingdao Xiaozu Bangongshi (推进“一带一路”建设工作领导小组办公室) [Office of the Leading Group for Promoting the Belt and Road Initiative], Zhongguo–Feizhou Guojia Gongjian “Yidai Yilu” Fazhan Baogao (中国—非洲国家共建“一带一路”发展报告) [Report on Joint Belt and Road Development Between China and African Countries], Yidaiyilu Guanfang Wangzhan (一带一路官方网站) [Belt and Road Portal] (Sept. 29, 2024), https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/a/icmp/2024/09/29/20240929179983118/b06ef6d7cbd74179ad662723a8616605.pdf. ↑
  12. China-Africa economic, trade cooperation reaches new heights, The State Council (Aug. 20, 2024), https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202408/20/content_WS66c47623c6d0868f4e8ea185.html. ↑
  13. China-Africa trade shifting toward more diversified, high value-added model, The State Council (June 13, 2025), https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202506/13/content_WS684c25edc6d0868f4e8f3532.html. ↑
  14. Nagla’a El-Hodiri, supra note 6. ↑
  15. Zhongfei Minjian Shanghui (中非民间商会) [China-Africa Business Council], Zhongfei Touzi Hezuo Zhuli Feizhou Gongyehua: 2024 Zhongguo Qiye Touzi Feizhou Baogao (中非投资合作助力非洲工业化：2024中国企业投资非洲报告) [China-Africa Investment Cooperation Supporting African Industrialization: 2024 Report on Chinese Enterprises Investing in Africa], China-Africa Business Council (Aug. 21, 2024), https://www.cabc.org.cn/report-cn-2024.pdf. ↑
  16. In many African countries, Chinese companies have become the default choice for infrastructure projects. For instance, Huawei is reported to be responsible for approximately 70% of the 4G network construction across the continent. See China’s Huawei Is Winning the 5G Race. Here’s What the United States Should Do To Respond, Council on Foreign Relations (Mar. 19, 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/19/for-africa-chinese-built-internet-is-better-than-no-internet-at-all/. ↑
  17. China-Africa Economic &Trade Research Institute, Africa Digital Economy Development lndex and China-Africa Digital Economy Cooperation Report, China.cn (May 10, 2024), http://download.china.cn/en/pdf/2024%E5%B9%B4%E6%8A%A5%E5%91%8A%E7%BB%88%E7%A8%BF.pdf. ↑
  18. Africa Smartphone Market, Market Data Forecast (Aug., 2025), https://www.marketdataforecast.com/market-reports/africa-smartphone-market. ↑
  19. Damilola Adeniran, Africa’s young people speak out about ending digital exclusion in their countries, World Bank Blogs (Dec. 16, 2019), https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/youth-transforming-africa/africas-young-people-speak-out-about-ending-digital-exclusion. ↑
  20. Chuzi Dianliang Silu Zhi Guang, Wajue Jingji Zengzhang Xin Dongneng: Chuanyin Chuxi Disanjie “Yidai Yilu” Guoji Hezuo Gaofeng Luntan (数字点亮丝路之光，挖掘经济增长新动能 传音出席第三届“一带一路”国际合作高峰论坛) [Digital Light Illuminates the Silk Road, Tapping New Drivers of Economic Growth: Transsion Attends the Third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation], Transsion (Oct. 19, 2023), https://www.transsion.com/zh-CN/news/old_svr_id_zh_b8fc4c49-3fbb-44d4-984d-4cff84f4d1bb. ↑
  21. This Chinese colloquialism conveys the idea of achieving wealth or success in a discreet, low‑profile manner, avoiding publicity or drawing attention while steadily accumulating gains. The phrase is famously used by former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin to describe a strategy of avoiding attention while accumulating wealth/power, contrasting with noisier approaches. ↑
  22. An Yan (安严), Chuanyin Shouji: Mensheng Fa Dacai de “Feizhou Zhi Wang” (传音手机：闷声发大财的“非洲之王”) [Transsion Mobile: The “King of Africa” Quietly Making a Fortune], 5 Shangye Guancha (商业观察) [Bus. Observer] 70, 71 (2019). ↑
  23. Shenzhen Chuanyin Konggu Gufen Youxian Gongsi (深圳传音控股股份有限公司) [Shenzhen Transsion Holdings Co., Ltd.], 2024 Nian Niandu Baogao (2024年年度报告) [2024 Annual Report], Cninfo (Apr. 23, 2025), https://static.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2025-04-24/1223237086.PDF. ↑
  24. Patrick Body, How Transsion Dominates Africa’s Phone Market, CKGSB Knowledge (Jan. 3, 2025), https://english.ckgsb.edu.cn/knowledge/article/tailored-technologies-how-transsion-came-to-dominate-the-african-phone-market/. ↑
  25. Peter Oluka, TECNO, Infinix, itel Drive Transsion to 26% MEA Market Share in Q2 2025, Tech | Business | Economy (Aug. 28, 2025), https://techeconomy.ng/tecno-infinix-itel-drive-transsion-to-26-mea-market-share-in-q2-2025/. ↑
  26. Craige Fleischer, How Access to Smartphones is Transforming Lives and Economies in Africa, Trustonic (May 25, 2024), https://www.trustonic.com/opinion/how-access-to-smartphones-is-transforming-lives-and-economies-in-africa/. ↑
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  28. Listed companies are in action丨Transsion Holdings: From the African continent to global emerging markets, explore new practices for technology brands to go overseas, Yicai Global (Feb. 20, 2025), https://www.yicaiglobal.com/star50news/2025_02_206795868534363652106. ↑
  29. Miao Lu, The Transsion Approach: Translating Chinese Mobile Technology in Africa (2025). ↑
  30. Africa’s Smartphone Shipments Grew 3% in 1Q26 but 2026 Outlook Falls 28% Amid Affordability Pressures, Omdia (May 26, 2026), https://omdia.tech.informa.com/pr/2026/may/africas-smartphone-shipments-grew-3percent-in-1q26-but-2026-outlook-falls-28percent-amid-affordability-pressures. ↑
  31. Zheng Chunhong (郑春红), Zoujin Feizhou Shichang de Falü Yaoshi—Du “Disi Jie Zhong-Fei Jingmao Bolanhui Feizhou Zhubin Guo Falü Huanjing Baogao” (走进非洲市场的法律钥匙——读《第四届中非经贸博览会非洲主宾国法律环境报告》) [The Legal Key to Entering the African Market—Review of Legal Environment Report of the African Guest Country at the 4th China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo], Z7 Zhongguo Touzi (中国投资) [China Inv.] 110, 111 (2025). ↑
  32. Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, 2024 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment 42 (2024). ↑
  33. Sandra Fullerton Joireman, Inherited Legal Systems and Effective Rule of Law: Africa and the Colonial Legacy, 39 J. Mod. Afr. Stud. 571 (2001). ↑
  34. Zhang Xiaohu (张小虎), “Yidai Yilu” Chanyi Xia Zhongguo Dui Fei Touzi de Huanjing Falü Fengxian yu Duice (“一带一路”倡议下中国对非投资的环境法律风险与对策) [Environmental Legal Risks and Countermeasures of China’s Investment in Africa under the Belt and Road Initiative], 20 Waiguo Fazhi Shi Yanjiu (外国法制史研究) [Stud. Foreign Legal Hist.] 148, 178 (2017). ↑
  35. Xu Weidong & Yan Hongting (徐卫东 & 闫泓汀), “Yidai Yilu” Chanyi Xia de Haiwai Touzi Falü Fengxian Duice (“一带一路”倡议下的海外投资法律风险对策) [Legal Risk Countermeasures for Overseas Investment under the Belt and Road Initiative], 27 Dongbeiya Luntan (东北亚论坛) [Ne. Asia F.] 26, 38 (2018). ↑
  36. Whyte, Challenges of Compliance Regulations in Africa, Skaletek (Dec. 3, 2024), https://skaletek.io/blog/challenges-of-compliance-regulations-in-africa/. ↑
  37. Uwe Kischel, The Context of African Law, in Comparative Law 631 (Andrew Hammel trans., 2019). ↑
  38. Amos Omollo, Customary and Informal Justice and Alternative Dispute Resolution in the East, Southern and Horn of Africa, International Commission of Jurists (June 30, 2020), https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Universal-GvaForum-Kenya-Publications-Reports-Seminar-or-conference-reports-2020-ENG.pdf. ↑
  39. Olabiyi, Olaniyi J. A study of conflict resolution mechanisms and employment relations in multinational corporations in Africa: Empirical evidence from Nigeria and South Africa. 20 SA J. Hum. Resource Mgmt. 1, 8 (2022). ↑
  40. Ifeoluwa A. Olubiyi, Uzoamaka A. Emerole & Ayokunle F. Adetula, Contemporary Challenges to Intellectual Property Rights in Developing Countries: Looking Beyond the Laws (Nigeria as a Case Study), 53 IIC–Int’l Rev. Intell. Prop. & Competition L. 5, 30 (2022). ↑
  41. Peter Adoko Obicci, Corrupt Elites, Administrative Cadres and Public Service in Africa: Islands of Vanity, 15 J. Mgmt. & Sci. 42, 82 (2025). ↑
  42. Many Chinese enterprises expanding overseas still carry domestic cognitive inertia, assuming that low product prices or popularity alone are sufficient to capture markets. The lack of basic commercial compliance awareness and experience in managing legal risks leaves many Chinese companies at a loss when confronted with sudden lawsuits, unable to reasonably safeguard their business gains. Zhisong Deng & Jianmin Dai, How Can Chinese Enterprises Cope with Increasingly Stringent Global Compliance Challenges and Government Investigations—From the Perspective of Anti-Monopoly Work and Data Protection, in The Challenge Of “Going Out”: Chinese Experiences In Outbound Investment 111, 121 (Huiyao Wang & Lu Miao eds., 2023). ↑
  43. Berihun A. Gebeye, Decoding Legal Pluralism in Africa, 49 J. Legal Pluralism & Unofficial L. 228, 249 (2017). ↑
  44. Modibo Ocran, The Clash of Legal Cultures: The Treatment of Indigenous Law in Colonial and Post-Colonial Africa, 39 Akron L. Rev. 465, 481 (2006). ↑
  45. Lanlan Hu & Mengyao Li (胡兰兰 & 李梦瑶), Zai Feizhou Zuoshengyi: Ni Gai Zhidao de Falü Fengxian (在非洲做生意：你该知道的法律风险) [Doing Business in Africa: Legal Risks You Should Know], The Paper (Sept. 2, 2022), https://m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_8996971?commTag=true. ↑
  46. Local content legislation has been continuously expanding in Africa’s mining, oil, and natural gas sectors, with many countries establishing specialized regulatory agencies and explicitly stipulating local content ratios in law. In some countries such as Zimbabwe, overly hasty or excessively stringent provisions have led to foreign capital withdrawal or frequent investment disputes. Zhu Weidong (朱伟东), Feizhou Bentuhua Lifa de Fazhan Qushi ji Yingdui Cuoshi (非洲本土化立法的发展趋势及应对措施) [Development Trends and Countermeasures of Localized Legislation in Africa], 7 Xueshu Tansuo (学术探索) [Academic Exploration] 42, 49 (2022). ↑
  47. Shan Yibing (单艺冰), “Yidai Yilu” Yanxian Guojia Duiwai Zhijie Touzi Fengxian Pinggu yu Fangfan (“一带一路”沿线国家对外直接投资风险评估与防范) [Risk Assessment and Prevention of Outbound Direct Investment in Belt and Road Countries], 15 Xiandai Shangye (现代商业) [Mod. Bus.] 139, 142 (2025). ↑
  48. 2024 Ip Filing Trends: Key Insights From Aripo’S Top Applicants, The African Regional Intellectual Property Organization (June 2, 2025), https://www.aripo.org/success-stories/2024-ip-filing-trends-key-insights-from-aripos-top-applicants-8251. ↑
  49. Id. ↑
  50. Margaret McMillan & Albert Zeufack, Labor Productivity Growth and Industrialization in Africa, 36 J. Econ. Persp. 3, 32 (2022). ↑
  51. Pelumi Abdul, Modern IP laws needed to curb digital piracy, Africa Legal (Nov. 12, 2024), https://www.africa-legal.com/news/modern-ip-laws-needed-to-curb-digital-piracy/120091. ↑
  52. Gary Pisano, Profiting from Innovation and the Intellectual Property Revolution, 35 Res. Pol’y 1122, 1130 (2006). ↑
  53. Cristina Enache, Tax Revenue in African Countries, Tax Foundation (Nov. 17, 2020), https://taxfoundation.org/blog/africa-tax-revenue-oecd-report-2020/. ↑
  54. Oyebola Okunogbe & Fabrizio Santoro, Increasing Tax Collection in African Countries: The Role of Information Technology, 32 (Supp. 1) J. Afr. Econ., i57-i83 (2023). ↑
  55. Aleksandra Bal, Africa’s Digital Tax Patchwork Requires Comprehensive Planning, Bloomberg Tax (July 10, 2025), https://news.bloombergtax.com/tax-insights-and-commentary/africas-digital-tax-patchwork-requires-comprehensive-planning. ↑
  56. Okey Umeano, Africa ramps up on taxation, AB Magazine (May, 2025), https://abmagazine.accaglobal.com/global/articles/2025/may/comment/africa-ramps-up-on-taxation.html. ↑
  57. Towards Greater Tax Transparency: Reforming Africa’s Legal Frameworks for Accountability and Growth, Africa Legal Network (Sept. 25, 2025), https://aln.africa/news/towards-greater-tax-transparency-reforming-africas-legal-frameworks-for-accountability-and-growth/. ↑
  58. Tujie Chuanyin Konggu Yi Jibao: Diyi Jidu Danji Jinglirun Tongbi Jian 69.87% (图解传音控股一季报：第一季度单季净利润同比减69.87%), Sina Finance (Apr. 28, 2025), https://cj.sina.com.cn/articles/view/1850649324/6e4eaaec02001u2g8. ↑
  59. Over the past two decades, the operations of Chinese enterprises in Africa have been largely driven by state-backed development financing and low-cost manufacturing, particularly in the construction and technology sectors. The expansion of Chinese companies in the African market—especially in consumer electronics, infrastructure, and light industry—has commonly relied on price competitiveness as a core strategic advantage. Elisa Gambino & Costanza Franceschini, Chinese Companies Are Changing the Way They Operate in Africa: Here’s How, Phys.org (Oct. 7, 2025), https://phys.org/news/2025-10-chinese-companies-africa.html. ↑
  60. See Shenzhen Transsion Holdings Co., Ltd., 2025 Annual Report 8, 34 (Mar. 28, 2026), https://static.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2026-03-28/1225047544.PDF. ↑
  61. See Shenzhen Transsion Holdings Co., Ltd., 2026 First Quarterly Report 1-3 (Apr. 28, 2026), https://static.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2026-04-28/1225199578.PDF. ↑
  62. Cengjing de “Feizhou Shouji Zhi Wang” Lirun Zhoujiang 70%! Fen’e Zao Qiang, Feizhou Shangyan Zhongguo Shouji Neizhan, Chuanyin Konggu Bei Xiaomi Men Songjin “Feizhou ICU” (曾经的“非洲手机之王”利润骤降70%！份额遭抢，非洲上演中国手机内战，传音控股被小米们送进“非洲ICU”), Xueqiu (May 16, 2025), https://xueqiu.com/6755337232/335305515. ↑
  63. Zhou Ke & Bai Yu (周科 & 白瑜), Yuanxing Feizhou, Zhe Kuan Zhongguo Shouji Kao Shenme Chuan “Jiayin” (远行非洲，这款中国手机靠什么传“佳音”) [Going Far in Africa: What Makes This Chinese Phone Deliver “Good News”], Xinhua Meiri Dianxun (新华每日电讯) [Xinhua Daily Telegraph], Jan. 24, 2024, at 1. ↑
  64. Tecno Maker Transsion Under Probe By KRA In Over Sh400B Tax Evasion, Nairobi Exposed (May 30, 2024), https://nairobi.exposed/corruption/tecno-maker-transsion-under-probe-by-kra-in-over-sh400b-tax-evasion/. ↑
  65. Tecno & Infinix’s parent company – Transsion Holdings under probe in Kenya for over US$3.02 billion in tax evasion, Simpet Global Logistics (May 26, 2024), https://simpetcargo.com/tecno-infinixs-parent-company-transsion-holdings-under-probe-in-kenya-for-over-us3-02-billion-in-tax-evasion/. ↑
  66. Kenya Insights Team, How Tax Evasion by Big Corporations Continues to Hurt the Weakened Kenyan Economy, Kenya Insights (Dec. 12, 2024), https://kenyainsights.com/how-tax-evasion-by-big-corporations-continues-to-hurt-the-weakened-kenyan-economy/. ↑
  67. Beizhikong Taoshui Chao 30 Yi Meiyuan Chuanyin Bei Diaocha? (被指控逃税超30亿美元 传音被调查？) [Accused of Evading Over $3 Billion in Taxes, Is Transsion Under Investigation?], Xueqiu, May 28, 2024, https://xueqiu.com/2211026279/291719514. ↑
  68. Hillary Keverenge, supra note 1. ↑
  69. Economic Commission for Africa, Base Erosion And Profit Shifting In Africa: Reforms to Facilitate Improved Taxation of Multinational Enterprises, UNECA (May 3, 2018), https://archive.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/base-erosion_rev.pdf. ↑
  70. Nara Monkam, African Strategies to Combat Illicit Financial Flows, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Nov. 11, 2024), https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/11/illicit-financial-flows-africa-tax?lang=en. ↑
  71. Joy Chukwu, Niger Expels Chinese Oil Executives, Shuts Down Hotel, West Africa Weekly (Mar. 15, 2025), https://westafricaweekly.com/icymi-niger-expels-3-chinese-oil-executives-shuts-down-chinese-owned-hotel-in-niamey/. ↑
  72. Rédaction Africanews, DR Congo: Civil society groups call for reassessment of China mining deal, Africa News (Aug. 25, 2025), https://www.africanews.com/2025/08/25/dr-congo-civil-society-groups-call-for-reassessment-of-china-mining-deal//. ↑
  73. ATAF strengthens transfer pricing audits through technical assistance in Eswatini, ATAF (Aug. 25, 2025), https://ataftax.org/news/ataf-strengthens-transfer-pricing-audits-through-technical-assistance-in-eswatini/. ↑
  74. Press Release Ataf Release 2023 Annual Report, ATAF (June 06, 2025), https://ataftax.org/news/press-release-ataf-release-2023-annual-report/. ↑
  75. Elisa Gambino & Costanza Franceschini, Chinese Companies Are Changing The Way They Operate in Africa., The Diplomat (Oct. 9, 2025), https://thediplomat.com/2025/10/chinese-companies-are-changing-the-way-they-operate-in-africa/. ↑
  76. Shi Lei, The 2025 Global Compliance Minefield: Navigating Outbound Chinese Investment Risks, Shi Lei Law Studio (June 26, 2025), https://slls.law/chinese-outbound-investment-compliance/. ↑
  77. Elisa Gambino & Costanza Franceschini, supra note 75. ↑
  78. Jevans Nyabiage, The growing risks for Chinese companies in conflict-ridden African nations, South China Morning Post (June 23, 2025), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3315136/growing-risks-chinese-companies-conflict-ridden-african-nations. ↑
  79. The author first extracted news articles from the website (See: https://www.transsion.com/zh-CN/search?category=news&currentPage=1) to build a corpus, and then applied keyword frequency analysis and grounded coding methods to generate quantitative data. ↑
  80. Marina Bornman & Simba Chirevo, Customs Valuation Challenges in Multinational Enterprises’ Controlled Transactions: An African Perspective, 8 J. Acct. & Fin. Emerging Econ. 459, 468 (2022). ↑
  81. Id. ↑
  82. “Where the importer and exporter are related in the sense of Customs Appendix C or other considerations in respect of value, values have to be declared as envisaged by Section 127 of the Customs Act in which case the price paid or payable may not conform to the statutory definition of value. Thus the price paid or payable has to be adjusted in accordance with specific rules of the Agreement on Customs valuation.” C52 Instruction Manual, KRA (Nov. 13, 2001), https://www.kra.go.ke/images/publications/C52instructionmanual.pdf. ↑
  83. Pascal Oleng, Revolutionising tax audit and compliance in West Africa: lessons from the natural resources sector, ODI Global (Sept. 30, 2025), https://odi.org/en/insights/revolutionising-tax-audit-and-compliance-in-west-africa-lessons-from-the-natural-resources-sector/. ↑
  84. Tax in Africa: Global Reforms Reshape Policies and Compliance from Transfer Pricing to Digital Commerce, Bloomberg Tax (Oct., 2024), https://pro.bloombergtax.com/insights/international-tax/tax-in-africa-adapting-to-global-reforms-and-compliance-needs/. ↑
  85. Id. ↑
  86. Common Enforcement Challenges in Developing Countries with Limited IP Infrastructure, Generis Global (Nov. 5, 2024), https://generisonline.com/common-enforcement-challenges-in-developing-countries-with-limited-ip-infrastructure/. ↑
  87. Benjamin C Elacqua et al., The Outlook for SEPs in 2025: Anti-Suit Injunctions, DOJ Policy and GenAI, IP Watch Dog (Mar. 21, 2025), https://ipwatchdog.com/2025/03/21/the-outlook-for-seps-in-2025-anti-suit-injunctions-doj-policy-and-genai/id=187157/. ↑
  88. Lionel Lim, Qualcomm sues China’s Transsion, the ‘Smartphone King of Africa,’ for infringing on its patents, Fortune Asia (July 15, 2024), https://fortune.com/asia/2024/07/15/qualcomm-sues-china-transsion-smartphone-violating-ip-patents-africa-india-south-asia/. ↑
  89. Id. ↑
  90. Sonoda & Kobayashi, Qualcomm and Philips sue Chinese smartphone maker Transsion, Lexology (July 31, 2024), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ed2fb77c-471d-4e63-bcb8-c8eb68345639. ↑
  91. Olivia Sophie Rafferty, BREAKING: Philips and Transsion settle Indian SEP dispute over AAC, USAC, IP Fray (July 16, 2025), https://ipfray.com/breaking-philips-and-transsion-settle-indian-sep-dispute-over-aac-usac/. ↑
  92. Adam Houldsworth, Qualcomm sues ‘Smartphone King of Africa’ at the UPC, Intellectual Asset Management (July 25, 2024), https://www.iam-media.com/article/qualcomm-sues-smartphone-king-of-africa-the-upc. ↑
  93. Florian Mueller, With UPC lawsuit against Transsion, Huawei joins fellow Access Advance licensors NEC, JVC, Sun Patent Trust in HEVC SEP enforcement, IP Fray (Aug. 4, 2025), https://ipfray.com/with-upc-lawsuit-against-transsion-huawei-joins-fellow-access-advance-licensors-nec-jvc-sun-patent-trust-in-hevc-sep-enforcement/. ↑
  94. Patience Mwaka Namfukwe, Intellectual Property in Africa: A Review of Legal Frameworks and Enforcement, 8 Int’l J. Acad. Multidisciplinary Res. 244, 247 (July 2024). ↑
  95. “Feizhou Shouji Zhi Wang” de Zhuanli Zhi Shang (“非洲手机之王”的专利之殇) [The Patent Woes of the “King of African Phones”], Sina Finance (Aug. 13, 2025), https://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/relnews/cn/2025-08-13/doc-infkvvmc6171573.shtml. ↑
  96. Adam Houldsworth, Ericsson Sues Transsion in Morocco, Indonesia and Colombia, IAM (Dec. 19, 2025), https://www.iam-media.com/article/ericsson-sues-transsion-in-morocco-indonesia-and-colombia; Olivia Sophie Rafferty, BREAKING: First-ever Major SEP Infringement Suits in South Africa, Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines – Ericsson Files Third Wave Against Transsion, IP Fray (Jan. 30, 2026), https://ipfray.com/breaking-first-ever-major-sep-infringement-suits-in-south-africa-vietnam-thailand-the-philippines-ericsson-files-third-wave-against-transsion/. ↑
  97. Olivia Sophie Rafferty, BREAKING: Transsion Escalates Ericsson Patent Litigation in UPC, Files its First-ever Public Patent Infringement Complaint, IP Fray (Mar. 26, 2026), https://ipfray.com/breaking-transsion-escalates-ericsson-patent-litigation-in-upc-files-its-first-ever-public-patent-infringement-complaint/. ↑
  98. ARIPO Annual Report 2020, African Regional Intellectual Property Organization (ARIPO) (Aug. 17, 2021), https://www.aripo.org/storage/annual-report/1674826541_php09vnh6.pdf. ↑
  99. Abdelali El Hourri, Exclusif. Télécoms: Tecno et Itel rattrapés par les brevets d’Ericsson au Maroc, MÉDIAS 24 (July 7, 2026), https://medias24.com/2026/07/07/exclusif-telecoms-tecno-et-itel-rattrapes-par-les-brevets-dericsson-au-maroc-1717825/. ↑
  100. Ericsson and Transsion Settle Global Patent Litigation, Ericsson (July 8, 2026), https://www.ericsson.com/en/news/2026/7/ericsson-and-transsion-settle-global-patent-litigation. ↑
  101. See Shenzhen Transsion Holdings Co., Ltd., 2025 Annual Report 33 (Mar. 28, 2026), https://static.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2026-03-28/1225047544.PDF. ↑
  102. InterDigital Awarded Injunction Against Transsion, InterDigital (Apr. 1, 2026), https://ir.interdigital.com/news-events/press-releases/news-details/2026/InterDigital-awarded-injunction-against-Transsion/default.aspx; For the aforementioned case, see InterDigital Patent Holdings Inc. v. Shenzhen Transsion Holdings Co. Ltd., CS(COMM) 1045/2025 & 1046/2025 (Delhi High Court July 1, 2026), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/115989779/. ↑
  103. Crossing the river by touching the stones means “to take one step and look around before taking another.” This phrase originated from Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic attitude toward China’s reform and opening-up. Together with the Cat Theory (“it doesn’t matter if a cat is black or white, if it catches mice it’s a good cat”), it has for decades been regarded by Chinese enterprises as a guiding principle for venturing abroad. Xiaobo Zhang, Arjan De Haan & Shenggen Fan, Narratives of Chinese Economic Reforms: How Does China Cross the River? 5 (2010). ↑
  104. Ren Yang (任洋), “Yidai Yilu” Beijng Xia Duiwai Touzi Huanjing Falü Fengxian Fangfan—Yi Feizhou Wei Zhuyao Shiyu (“一带一路”背景下对外投资环境法律风险防范——以非洲为主要视阈) [Legal Risk Prevention in Overseas Investment Environment under the Belt and Road Initiative—With Africa as the Main Perspective], 42 Sanxia Daxue Xuebao (Renwen Shehui Kexue Ban) (三峡大学学报（人文社会科学版）) [J. China Three Gorges U. (Human. & Soc. Sci.)], 99, 107 (2020). ↑
  105. Based on the information currently available, Transsion attaches great importance to promoting and training an information and privacy security culture, helping employees quickly acquire knowledge related to information and privacy protection, and comprehensively strengthening their ability to prevent and respond to information security risks at multiple levels. However, such training remains confined to an internal corporate perspective and does not take into account the equal importance of data compliance in Africa or other overseas regions. Qianghua Anquan Zeren Yishi, Chuanyin Kaizhan Disijie Xinxi ji Yinsi Anquan Wenhua Xuanchuan Zhou Huodong (强化安全责任意识，传音开展第四届信息及隐私安全文化宣传周活动) [Strengthening Safety Responsibility Awareness: Transsion Launches the Fourth Information and Privacy Security Culture Promotion Week], Chuanyin Konggu Weixin Gongzhonghao (传音控股微信公众号) [Transsion Holdings Official WeChat Account] (Nov. 28, 2024), https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/SMYhoSX5exGGgijdu-04lQ. ↑
  106. Tajudeen Alaburo Abdulsalam, Rofiat Bolanle Tajudeen & Enyi Francis, Sustainable Competitive Advantage in the Legal Industry: A Review of Business Strategies and Market Entry Approaches for Gowling WLG in Japan and Nigeria, 8 Lapai J. Econ. 100 (2024). ↑
  107. O. Ajakaye & Adeyinka Lawal, Reforming Intellectual Property Systems in Africa: Opportunities and Enforcement Challenges under Regional Trade Frameworks, Int’l J. Multidisciplinary Res. & Growth Evaluation 84, 102 (2024). ↑
  108. Zhang Xiaohu & Li Min (张小虎 & 李敏), Nanfei Shangbiao Qiangzhu Fengxian ji qi Falü Jiujie (南非商标抢注风险及其法律救济) [Risks of Trademark Squatting in South Africa and Legal Remedies], Z8 Zhongguo Touzi (中国投资) [China Inv.] 108, 109 (2023). ↑
  109. A subsidiary of Transsion Holdings is currently exploring pathways to transition its mobile phones from basic communication devices to intelligent products. At the Business of Design Week 2025, Infinix announced a strategic design partnership with the legendary Italian firm Pininfarina, which boasts a 95-year history. This collaboration will be inaugurated with the launch of the Infinix NOTE 60 Ultra, marking the beginning of a new era in premium mobile design. Infinix yu Yidali Chuanqi Sheji Gongsi Pininfarina Dacheng Zhanlüe Sheji Hezuo, Gong Su Gaoduan Zhinen Shouji Weilai (Infinix与意大利传奇设计公司Pininfarina达成战略设计合作，共塑高端智能手机未来) [Infinix Reaches Strategic Design Cooperation with Italian Legendary Design Company Pininfarina to Shape the Future of High-End Smartphones], Chuanyin Konggu Weixin Gongzhonghao (传音控股微信公众号) [Transsion Holdings Official Wechat Account] (Dec. 8, 2025), https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/SBrhHLvo-C1msfnGZXoUDQ. ↑
  110. Olivia Sophie Rafferty, BREAKING: Transsion Escalates Ericsson Patent Litigation in UPC, Files its First-Ever Public Patent Infringement Complaint, IP Fray (Mar. 26, 2026), https://ipfray.com/breaking-transsion-escalates-ericsson-patent-litigation-in-upc-files-its-first-ever-public-patent-infringement-complaint/. ↑
  111. Qinqin Zheng, Yadong Luo & Vladislav Maksimov, Achieving Legitimacy through Corporate Social Responsibility: The Case of Emerging Economy Firms, 50 J. World Bus. 389, 403 (2015). ↑
  112. Stephen Ndegwa, Chinese investment advances labor rights and prosperity in Africa, CGTN (June 27, 2025), https://news.cgtn.com/news/2025-06-27/Chinese-investment-advances-labor-rights-and-prosperity-in-Africa-1ExK79k3FMQ/p.html. ↑
  113. Devdutt Pattanaik, Public Perception of Corporate Environmental Commitments: How Communication Shapes Trust, 1 J. Jurivox 63 (2024). ↑
  114. Zhisong Deng & Jianmin Dai, supra note 42. ↑
  115. Li Zuhua & Duan Zhizhuang (李祖华 & 段知壮), Woguo Qiye Dui Fei Touzi Zhengduan Jiejue Jizhi Tanxi (我国企业对非投资争端解决机制探析) [An Analysis of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms for Chinese Enterprises’ Investment in Africa], 21 Feizhou Yanjiu (非洲研究) [Afr. Stud.] 209, 223 (2023). ↑
  116. Yang Bochao & Li Dan (杨博超 & 李丹), “Yidai Yilu” Shangshi Zhengduan Jiejue Jizhi de Tixi Jiangou yu Fazhan Mianxiang (“一带一路”商事争端解决机制的体系建构与发展面向) [System Construction and Development Orientation of the Belt and Road Commercial Dispute Resolution Mechanism], 3 Shangye Yanjiu (商业研究) [Comm. Res.] 80, 88 (2022). ↑
  117. On October 20, 2025, the inauguration ceremony of the International Organization for Mediation (IOMed) was held in Hong Kong, China. The IOMed will supplement existing international litigation and arbitration mechanisms and provide a new platform for all parties to peacefully settle international disputes through mediation. International Organization for Mediation Officially Inaugurated, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC (Oct. 20, 2025), https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/wjbxw/202510/t20251020_11736945.html. ↑
  118. Lianghui Tegao丨Shizhong Baoche Nongchao’er de Juese—Xi Jinping Zongshuji Canjia Jiangsu Daibiaotuan Shiyi Ceji (两会特稿丨始终保持弄潮儿的角色——习近平总书记参加江苏代表团审议侧记) [Special Report on the Two Sessions: Always Playing the Role of a Tide Rider—Notes on General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Participation in the Jiangsu Delegation’s Deliberations], Xin Hua Net, Mar. 7, 2025, https://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/20250307/01bfce82e081400bab000bb097ad0126/c.html. ↑
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