{"id":1622,"date":"2021-08-12T16:54:14","date_gmt":"2021-08-12T08:54:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/stllawreview.com\/?p=1622"},"modified":"2021-08-12T16:54:14","modified_gmt":"2021-08-12T08:54:14","slug":"pursuing-corrupt-fugitives-on-chinas-trial-in-absentia-system","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/stllawreviewblog.com\/index.php\/2021\/08\/12\/pursuing-corrupt-fugitives-on-chinas-trial-in-absentia-system\/","title":{"rendered":"Pursuing Corrupt Fugitives: On China\u2019s Trial-in-Absentia System"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"Yang<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0Ms. Yang Xiuzhu in the dock<\/span><\/p>\n

Chen Liang (\u9648\u9753)[1]<\/a><\/sup><\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

Table of Contents<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Abstract<\/strong> <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

I.<\/strong> Introduction<\/strong> <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

II.<\/strong> Background of the TIA System<\/strong> <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

A. National Policies against General Corruption <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

1. Starting Point in Late 2012 <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

2. Evolving Campaign by 2018 <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

3. New System since 2018 <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

B. Political Incentives on Chasing Corrupt Fugitives <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

1. Starting from 2014 <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

2. Law Enforcement Projects <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

3. Calls for a TIA System <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

C. Conclusion <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

III.<\/strong> How the TIA System Works<\/strong> <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

A. Investigation Phase <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

1. Jurisdiction of the TIA System <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

2. When to Transfer a Case for Prosecution <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

3. Conclusion <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

B. Prosecution Phase <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

1. Statutory Requirements <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

2. Discretion <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

3. Conclusion <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

C. Adjudication Phase <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

1. When to Accept a Case with the TIA Procedure <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

2. What to Do after the Acceptance <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

3. Termination and Retrial <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

4. Conclusion <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

D. Conclusion <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

IV.<\/strong> Why the TIA System was Created<\/strong> <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

A. Failure of Methods Prior to the TIA System <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

1. Voluntary Appearance <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

2. Extradition <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

3. Conclusion <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

B. TIA System as a Response to\u00a0 Defects <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

C. Conclusion <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

V.<\/strong> The TIA System and Right to be Present at Trial<\/strong> <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

A. The Right to be Present at Trial <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

1. Presence at Trial is both a Right and a Duty <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

2. Limitation on the Right to be Present at Trial <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

B. TIA System & Human Rights<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

C. Conclusion <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

VI.<\/strong> Conclusion<\/strong> <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Abstract<\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n

Along with the nationwide anti-corruption campaign in China, the Chinese government created a novel trial-in-absentia system to deal with corrupt fugitives. This article reviews the policy background of the system\u2019s birth and how the system works in theory. Then, by reviewing prior approaches to deal with corrupt fugitives, this article argues that the trial-in-absentia system can solve intrinsic defects of prior approaches and can bring more benefits to the Chinese government.\u00a0Finally, by comparing the Chinese trial-in-absentia system with international human rights law on the defendant\u2019s right to be present at trial, this article argues that the Chinese trial-in-absentia system against corrupt fugitives complies with international human rights law in theory.<\/span><\/p>\n

Key Words<\/strong>: Trial-in-Absentia; Corrupt Fugitives; Anti-Corruption Campaign in China; Right to be Present<\/span><\/p>\n

I. Introduction<\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n

Justice delayed is justice denied. Unlike houses or land, suspects may often flee away from legal proceedings such as arrest warrants, making it hard for justice to decide whether they are guilty or not.<\/span><\/p>\n

Such delays happen to some suspects of corruption crimes in China. Take Yang Xiuzhu\/\u6768\u79c0\u73e0, pictured above, as an example.[2]<\/a><\/sup> After her family member was investigated for corruption, Ms. Yang, former Deputy Director of the Construction Department of Zhejiang Province, fled to Hong Kong in 2003 and arrived in the United States in 2014. After her application for political asylum encountered obstacles in the United States, she finally decided to cancel the asylum application and went back to China to face trial in 2016. The gap between when an arrest warrant was issued against Ms. Yang and when she finally faced trial in China is 13 years. That is a long delay, mostly because she was physically outside of the jurisdiction of mainland China. Ms. Yang\u2019s case is not alone. According to the National Supervisory Commission (\u56fd\u5bb6\u76d1\u5bdf\u59d4\u5458\u4f1a, \u201cNSC\u201d), 7831 fugitives went back to China for trial from 2014 to 2020,[3]<\/a><\/sup> indicating the total number of fugitives was much larger than 7831.<\/span><\/p>\n

Partially under this background, China revised its Criminal Procedure Law[4]<\/a><\/sup><\/em> to include a novel trial-in-absentia (\u201cTIA\u201d)[5]<\/a><\/sup> system to target corruption crimes in 2018.[6]<\/a><\/sup> Although the framework of the TIA system is still being finalized, the authority has issued several general rules and drafts for rules. On 30 December 2019, the Supreme People\u2019s Procuratorate (\u6700\u9ad8\u4eba\u6c11\u68c0\u5bdf\u9662, \u201cSPP\u201d) issued the new Rules of Criminal Procedure for People\u2019s Procuratorates<\/em> (\u201cProsecution Rules of Procedure<\/em>\u201d) to include a specific section on the TIA process.[7]<\/a><\/sup> On 26 January 2021, the Supreme People\u2019s Court (\u6700\u9ad8\u4eba\u6c11\u6cd5\u9662, \u201cSPC\u201d) issued the Interpretation of the SPC on the Application of the Criminal Procedure Law<\/em> (\u201cCriminal Procedure Interpretation<\/em>\u201d), which includes detailed provisions on the TIA system.[8]<\/a><\/sup> On 17 May 2021, the NSC issued the Implementing Measures of the Supervision Law (Draft for Comments)<\/em>[9]<\/a><\/sup> (\u201cSupervision Measure Draft<\/em>\u201d), which includes a specific article on the TIA system.[10]<\/a><\/sup> Although there is still no final judgment in any TIA case,[11]<\/a><\/sup> the author expects that more and more cases would be brought after the finalization of the TIA system because frequent issuance of rules by the authorities indicates that the authorities are paying more attention to the TIA system.<\/span><\/p>\n

In the following parts, this article will:<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Explain the background of the TIA system; <\/span><\/li>\n
  2. Explore how the TIA system works according to available norms; <\/span><\/li>\n
  3. Assess whether the TIA system can achieve its goal when compared to competing systems for pursuing fugitives; and <\/span><\/li>\n
  4. Discuss whether the TIA system preserves the defendant\u2019s human right to be present.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    II. Background of the TIA System<\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n

    Any system, including the TIA system, does not exist in a vacuum, and the TIA system is no exception. In order to have a comprehensive understanding of the system, a thorough assessment of the policy background of the TIA system\u2019s birth is necessary. Considering the TIA system is closely related to China\u2019s anti-corruption campaign, this section will review the anti-corruption policies of the Communist Party of China (\u201cCPC\u201d or \u201cParty\u201d) over the years.<\/span><\/p>\n

    To this end, the following parts of this section will:<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n
    1. Describe how a nationwide political campaign against general corruption evolved up to 2018; and<\/span><\/li>\n
    2. Explore how the political incentives contributed to a more active pursuit of corrupt fugitives.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

      A. National Policies against General Corruption<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

      After Mr. Xi Jinping was elected as General Secretary of CPC in November 2012, a nationwide campaign against corruption was started and is ongoing. This part will focus on several key points and stages from 2012 to 2018 when the TIA system was created.<\/span><\/p>\n

      1. Starting Point in Late 2012<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

      2012 marks the starting point of the anti-corruption campaign in China. The campaign was indicated in President Xi\u2019s statement after his election and started with a strict rule on all Party members and an investigation of numerous high officials within the Party.<\/span><\/p>\n

      We can take a hint of the upcoming campaign from President Xi\u2019s statement right after his election. On 15 November 2012, along with other newly elected CPC top leaders, President Xi held a conference with reporters from home and abroad. In that conference, President Xi clearly stated that \u201cin the new situation, our Party is facing many hard challenges, and there are many intraparty problems unsolved. In particular, we shall spare no effort to solving the problem of corruption among party officers\u2026.\u201d[12]<\/a><\/sup> From the emphasis in his statement, it is reasonable to expect a campaign against corruption was on its way.<\/span><\/p>\n

      As expected, a strict rule was issued, and a high official within the CPC was investigated for suspected corruption. Both actions were taken shortly, and the People\u2019s Daily, an official newspaper of the CPC Central Committee, regarded them as the opening of the fierce anti-corruption campaign in China.[13]<\/a><\/sup><\/span><\/p>\n

      On 4 December, the CPC Central Politburo issued the Eight Provisions on Improving the Working Style and Keeping Close Contact with the People<\/em> (\u201cEight Provisions\u201d), which requires party members to \u201cstrictly obey relevant rules of probity in politics.\u201d[14]<\/a><\/sup> On 6 December, two days after the issuance of the Eight Provisions, the CPC Central Committee for Discipline Inspection (\u4e2d\u5171\u4e2d\u592e\u7eaa\u5f8b\u68c0\u67e5\u59d4\u5458\u4f1a, \u201cCCDI\u201d)[15]<\/a><\/sup> confirmed that Mr. Li Chuncheng\/\u674e\u6625\u57ce, former Deputy Secretary of the CPC Sichuan Provincial Committee, had been under investigation due to suspected violations of CPC policies.[16]<\/a><\/sup> On 12 October 2015, a court sentenced Mr. Li to 13 years in prison for accepting bribes and abusing power.[17]<\/a><\/sup><\/span><\/p>\n

      To conclude, since President Xi\u2019s election as General Secretary of CPC, anti-corruption became a crucial focus of the CPC. The Eight Provisions and the investigation of Mr. Li Chuncheng marked the start of the nationwide anti-corruption campaign.<\/span><\/p>\n

      2. Evolving Campaign by 2018<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

      The nationwide anti-corruption campaign evolved by 2017 and became more and more comprehensive. During this period, the Party paid more attention to strengthening its supervision commissions whose mandates[18]<\/a><\/sup> include anti-corruption and targeted the most top CPC leaders ever in history. At the same time, the State\u2019s supervision system was also restructured to correspond with the emphasis on anti-corruption.<\/span><\/p>\n

      At the beginning of 2013, President Xi delivered a speech on 22 January 2013 in the Second Plenary Meeting of the CCDI and emphasized that \u201cthe anti-corruption situation is still grim. There are still many aspects with which people are not satisfied. \u2026 The anti-corruption campaign is a long-term, complicated and arduous assignment. \u2026 We shall be firmly determined to fight every corruption if any, continue to eradicate the soil where corruption grows and spreads, and satisfy the people with actual effects.\u201d[19]<\/a><\/sup> If some then viewed President Xi\u2019s statement in 2012 as a publicity strategy, President Xi\u2019s statement, which focused on the soil contributing to corruption, successfully dissolved such doubts. It indicated that more specific and comprehensive actions would be taken to counter corruption. On 12 November, the CPC issued the Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reform<\/em>, which in part requires \u201cimproving the system of punishing and preventing corruption\u201d[20]<\/a><\/sup>. On 25 December, the CPC Central Committee issued the Working Plan for Establishing and Improving the System of Punishing and Preventing Corruption from 2013 to 2017<\/em> to address such requirements. The top-level Working Plan showed how vital the anti-corruption campaign was to the CPC.[21]<\/a><\/sup><\/span><\/p>\n

      In 2014, the tone from the top became actions on the top. Three investigations were launched against Xu Caihou\/\u5f90\u624d\u539a, a former member of the CPC Central Committee and a top leader of the People\u2019s Liberation Army,[22]<\/a><\/sup> Zhou Yongkang\/\u5468\u6c38\u5eb7, a former permanent member of the CPC Central Committee,[23]<\/a><\/sup> and Ling Jihua\/\u4ee4\u8ba1\u5212, a former member of the CPC Central Committee.[24]<\/a><\/sup> Before these three cases, never has the CPC anti-corruption campaign targeted officials at that top level. These tones or even actions from the top further illustrated the importance and seriousness of the anti-corruption campaign.<\/span><\/p>\n

      In 2016, there was a hint that the Constitution would be amended to further the anti-corruption campaign. In 2016, the constitutional structure under the National People\u2019s Congress (\u5168\u56fd\u4eba\u6c11\u4ee3\u8868\u5927\u4f1a, \u201cNPC\u201d) was \u201cOne Fu and Two Yuan (\u4e00\u5e9c\u4e24\u9662)\u201d which refers to government (One Fu), and court and procuratorate (Two Yuan).[25]<\/a><\/sup> As for the supervision power of the State, it was vested upon the government, such as the Ministry of Supervision (\u76d1\u5bdf\u90e8) and the National Bureau of Corruption Prevention (\u56fd\u5bb6\u9884\u9632\u8150\u8d25\u5c40)[26]<\/a><\/sup> subject to the State Council (\u56fd\u52a1\u9662), and the procuratorate, such as the General Bureau of Anti-Corruption and Anti-Bribery (\u53cd\u8d2a\u6c61\u8d3f\u8d42\u603b\u5c40) subject to the SPP. However, the NPC Standing Committee, following the Party\u2019s proposal, passed the Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People\u2019s Congress on Carrying out the Pilot Program of Reforming the National Supervision Mechanism in Beijing Municipality, Shanxi Province, and Zhejiang Province<\/em> on 25 December.[27]<\/a><\/sup> According to the pilots, the supervision power of the State was consolidated into supervision committees independent from governments, courts, and procuratorates in these areas.[28]<\/a><\/sup> For clarity, the pilots focused on the State instead of the Party, so the Party\u2019s supervision power was still vested in supervision commissions of the Party, such as CCDI.<\/span><\/p>\n

      In 2017, the pilots in Beijing, Shanxi, and Zhejiang were extended to the whole nation[29]<\/a><\/sup> on 4 December according to the Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People\u2019s Congress on Promoting the Pilot Program on the National Supervisory System Reform all over the Country<\/em>.[30]<\/a><\/sup> This decision is a clear hint that the Constitution of the People\u2019s Republic of China (\u201cConstitution\u201d) would possibly be amended to formally transfer the supervision power carried out by the governments and procuratorates to the supervisory commissions.<\/span><\/p>\n

      To conclude, the nationwide anti-corruption campaign evolved with more attention by targeting top leaders of the Party and signaling plans to amend the Constitution to further the campaign in this period.<\/span><\/p>\n

      3. New System since 2018<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

      Following the evolving trend, the Chinese amended the Constitution in 2018 and created a new supervision system along with the Constitution amendment.<\/span><\/p>\n

      On 11 March, the NPC passed the Amendment to the Constitution which, as indicated in the pilots, transferred the \u201cOne Fu and Two Yuan\u201d system into the \u201cOne Fu, One Wei and Two Yuan (\u4e00\u5e9c\u4e00\u59d4\u4e24\u9662).\u201d The Amendment inserted Chapter 3 Section 7 (Arts. 123-27) to create the supervisory commissions led by the NSC to be in charge of corruption and other crimes.[31]<\/a><\/sup><\/span><\/p>\n

      On March 21, 10 days after the Amendment to the Constitution, the CPC Central Committee issued the Plan on Deepening the Reform of the Party and State Institutions,<\/em> which proposed that the NSC should \u201cwork together with the CCDI, and undertake both disciplinary and supervisory mandates as the same working institution with two names.\u201d[32]<\/a><\/sup> Such a proposal later became a reality. As stated by Mr. Zhao Leji\/\u8d75\u4e50\u9645 in his Working Report in the Third Plenary Meeting of the 19th CCDI<\/em> on 11 January 2019, \u201cthe CCDI and NSC have fulfilled the requirements of working together.\u201d[33]<\/a><\/sup> In other words, the NSC and CCDI have been sharing the same officials and offices since the implementation of such a proposal.[34]<\/a><\/sup><\/span><\/p>\n

      To conclude, along with the Amendments to the Constitution, the supervisory commissions were created to exercise the State\u2019s supervision power which had been vested upon governments and procuratorates.[35]<\/a><\/sup> However, the institutions exercising the Party’s supervision power are still supervision commissions of the Party. Legally speaking, the supervisory commissions of the State are independent of the supervision commissions of the Party. However, following the requirements of working together, these two kinds of institutions have been sharing the same officials and offices.<\/span><\/p>\n

      B. Political Incentives to Chase Corrupt Fugitives<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

      As noted above, anti-corruption has been a focus of the Party and State since 2012, and chasing officials who were accused of corruption but went overseas (“corrupt fugitives”) is an essential part of the campaign as well.<\/span><\/p>\n

      1. Starting from 2014<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

      The emphasis on chasing fugitives started in 2014, and many rules and mechanisms were created to pursue corrupt fugitives.<\/span><\/p>\n

      On 15 January, the Communiqu\u00e9 of the 18th CCDI 3rd Plenary Meeting clearly stated that the Party should \u201cintensify more efforts to chasing fugitives and recovering assets, and shall never leave corrupted people unpunished.\u201d[36]<\/a><\/sup><\/span><\/p>\n

      In June, the Working Office for Internationally Chasing Fugitives and Recovering Assets<\/a> (\u56fd\u9645\u8ffd\u9003\u8ffd\u8d43\u5de5\u4f5c\u529e\u516c\u5ba4) was created to address this issue.[37]<\/a><\/sup> The office consists of people from the CCDI, SPC, SPP, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (\u5916\u4ea4\u90e8, \u201cMFA\u201d), Ministry of Public Security (\u516c\u5b89\u90e8, \u201cMPS\u201d), Ministry of State Security (\u56fd\u5b89\u90e8), People\u2019s Bank of China (\u4e2d\u56fd\u4eba\u6c11\u94f6\u884c, \u201cPBOC\u201d), etc.[38]<\/a><\/sup><\/span><\/p>\n

      On 9 November, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, to which China is a party, passed the Beijing Declaration on Fighting Corruption, promoting international cooperation on tackling corruption crimes. This declaration further clarifies that chasing fugitives is a central concern for China.[39]<\/a><\/sup><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

      2. Law Enforcement Projects<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

      Apart from setting rules and mechanisms, many enforcement actions were taken as well.<\/span><\/p>\n

      In 2015, a project, namely Skynet\/\u5929\u7f51, was launched to target corrupt fugitives.[40]<\/a><\/sup> The Skynet Project is an interdepartmental project that includes the Organizational Department of the CPC Central Committee, SPP, MPS, PBOC, etc. During the cooperation, the \u201cOperation Fox Hunt 2015\/\u730e\u72d02015,\u201d led by the MPS, was launched to counter corrupt fugitives as part of the Skynet project. Apart from the MPS, other departments, such as SPC, SPP, etc, also participated in the \u201cOperation Fox Hunt 2015\u201d.[41]<\/a><\/sup> In the same year, the International Criminal Police Organization (\u201cINTERPOL\u201d) issued Red Notices for 100 Chinese fugitives suspected of corruption.[42]<\/a><\/sup> By August 2020, 60 people among the 100 had been brought back to China for trial.[43]<\/a><\/sup><\/span><\/p>\n

      3. Calling for a TIA System<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

      As President Xi Jinping kept emphasizing anti-corruption from an international perspective, China called for more ways to pursue fugitives. As revealed by this article, one way adopted by the Chinese government is the TIA system.[44]<\/a><\/sup><\/span><\/p>\n

      On 18 October 2017, President Xi Jinping specifically addressed again in his report at the 19th National Congress of the Party that \u201cno matter where the corrupt officials flee, they shall be brought to justice.\u201d[45]<\/a><\/sup> From such a statement, we can see that the tone from the top expressly conveyed the information that chasing corrupt fugitives is one of the main concerns of the CPC.<\/span><\/p>\n

      As for the academic side, although some Chinese scholars have researched trial-in-absentia in criminal law, most research was either too general[46]<\/a><\/sup> or focusing on topics other than pursuing fugitives.[47]<\/a><\/sup> In 2016, major scholars started proposing a TIA system to pursue corrupt fugitives,[48]<\/a><\/sup> and more and more scholars have started to discuss this topic since then.[49]<\/a><\/sup><\/span><\/p>\n

      Finally, the political incentives and academic research converged in 2018. Within a few years after the statement by Xi Jinping, the TIA system was created by revising the Criminal Procedure Law on 26 October 2018.<\/span><\/p>\n

      C. Conclusion<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

      To conclude, there are more and more political incentives to carry out a general anti-corruption campaign after Mr. Xi was elected as General Secretary of CPC. In the meantime, chasing corrupt fugitives is one of the most important matters for the CPC, and such incentives finally contributed to the birth of the TIA system.<\/span><\/p>\n

      III. How the TIA System Works<\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n

      As a response to the political incentives occurring since 2012, the TIA system was introduced to China in 2018, but no cases have been finalized up to date. Mr. Zhang Jun, Attorney-General of the SPP, disclosed on 8 March 2021 that a TIA proceeding was first launched in 2020.[50]<\/a><\/sup> That said, that case is still ongoing, and there is no detailed information about that case. Therefore, this section will explore how the TIA system works in theory, given available norms.<\/span><\/p>\n

      Under the current structure, the TIA system can be divided into three phases based on the phases of the Chinese criminal justice system, and the following parts of this section will assess:<\/span><\/p>\n

        \n
      1. The investigation phase by supervisory commissions; <\/span><\/li>\n
      2. The prosecution phase by procuratorates; and <\/span><\/li>\n
      3. The adjudication phase and possible termination by courts.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

        A. Investigation Phase<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

        Every indictment, whether in absentia<\/em> or not, starts only after investigation and transfer for prosecution. The TIA system is no exception. According to Art. 291 of the Criminal Procedure Law and Art. 505 of the Prosecution Rules of Procedure, only cases transferred from a supervisory commission for prosecution are potentially subject to the TIA system. Next, the author will<\/span><\/p>\n

          \n
        1. Clarify the jurisdiction of supervisory commissions related to the TIA system; and<\/span><\/li>\n
        2. Assess when a case will be transferred for prosecution.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

          1. Jurisdiction of the TIA System<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

          As mentioned above, only corruption cases referred by a supervisory commission are potentially within the scope of the TIA system. By assessing the relevant rules, it can be found that the subject matters of the system are crimes under Chapter 8 of the Criminal Law<\/em> (\u5211\u6cd5) if they are committed by \u201ca public official,\u201d a term often used by the general public but without definition.<\/span><\/p>\n

          a. Crimes Covered by the TIA System<\/strong><\/span><\/h4>\n

          Chapter 8 of the Criminal Law <\/em>listed the crimes covered by the TIA systems.<\/span><\/p>\n

          The crimes defined in Article 291 of the Criminal Procedure Law<\/em> are corruption crimes (\u8d2a\u6c61\u8d3f\u8d42\u72af\u7f6a) which has the same meaning as the title (\u8d2a\u6c61\u8d3f\u8d42\u7f6a) of the Criminal Law<\/em> Chapter 8. Such an explanation is supported by the Regulations on the Jurisdiction of the National Supervisory Commission (For Trial Use)<\/em> which defined the term \u201c\u8d2a\u6c61\u8d3f\u8d42\u72af\u7f6a (corruption crimes)\u201d cases precisely the same as those covered by the Criminal Law<\/em> Chapter 8.[51]<\/a><\/sup><\/span><\/p>\n

          Accordingly, the crimes subject to the TIA system can be presented in the following chart.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
          <\/td>\nDescription of the Crime(s)[52]<\/a><\/sup><\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nArticle(s) of Criminal Law<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          1<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nCorruption (\u8d2a\u6c61\u7f6a)<\/span><\/td>\n382, 394<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          2<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nMisappropriating public funds (\u632a\u7528\u516c\u6b3e\u7f6a)<\/span><\/td>\n384<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          3<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nAccepting bribes (\u53d7\u8d3f\u7f6a)[53]<\/a><\/sup><\/span><\/td>\n385, 387, 388 and 388-1<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          4<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nOffering bribes (\u884c\u8d3f\u7f6a)<\/span><\/td>\n389, and 391-393<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          5<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nHolding a huge amount of property with unknown sources (\u5de8\u989d\u8d22\u4ea7\u6765\u6e90\u4e0d\u660e\u7f6a)<\/span><\/td>\n395.1<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          6<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nConcealing overseas deposits (\u9690\u7792\u5883\u5916\u5b58\u6b3e\u7f6a)<\/span><\/td>\n395.2<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          7<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nPrivately distributing state-owned assets (\u79c1\u5206\u56fd\u6709\u8d44\u4ea7\u7f6a)<\/span><\/td>\n396.1<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          8<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nPrivate distributing confiscated assets (\u79c1\u5206\u7f5a\u6ca1\u8d22\u7269\u7f6a)<\/span><\/td>\n396.2<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

          (A List of Crimes Covered by the TIA System)<\/span><\/p>\n

          b. Personal Jurisdiction of the TIA System<\/strong><\/span><\/h4>\n

          According to the related articles of the Criminal Law<\/em>, there are requirements on who can commit these crimes; in other words, only people with specific identities (usually jobs) can commit the crimes covered by the TIA system. However, considering such requirements can hardly be ascertained merely based on the Criminal Law<\/em>, this article will assess the personal jurisdiction of the TIA system.<\/span><\/p>\n

          According to Art. 15 of the Supervision Law<\/em>, the crimes subject to the TIA system can be committed by 6 types of people, and these 6 types are listed in the following chart with examples.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
          <\/td>\nType of the Actor(s)<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nExample(s)<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          1<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nCivil servants<\/strong> of organs of the CPC, people\u2019s congresses and their standing committees, people\u2019s governments, supervisory commissions, people\u2019s courts, people\u2019s procuratorates, Chinese People\u2019s Political Consultative Conference (\u201cCPPCC\u201d) commissions, democratic parties, and federations of industry and commerce, and other people managed accordingly under the Civil Servant Law<\/span><\/td>\nAn official in the CCDI, a deputy to the NPC, an official in MFA, an official in NSC, etc.<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          2<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nPeople engaged in public affairs<\/strong> in organizations managing public affairs upon authorization by laws or regulations or lawful entrustment by state organs<\/span><\/td>\nAn official in the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          3<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nManagers of state-owned enterprises<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nA manager in the China National Petroleum Corporation<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          4<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nPeople engaged in management affairs in public entities<\/strong> of education, science, culture, health, sports, etc.<\/span><\/td>\nA president of a public university<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          5<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nPeople engaged in management affairs at mass organizations of self-management at the grass-roots level<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nA director of a residents committee<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
          6<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nOther people who perform public duties<\/strong> according to the law[54]<\/a><\/sup><\/span><\/td>\nN\/A<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

          (A List of Persons Subject to the TIA System)<\/span><\/p>\n

          2. When to Transfer a Case for Prosecution<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

          A supervisory commission must meet both substantive and procedural requirements when transferring a case for prosecution under the TIA system.<\/span><\/p>\n

          a. Substantive Requirements<\/strong><\/span><\/h4>\n

          As for the substantive side, Art. 45 of the Supervision Law<\/em> stipulates that a supervisory commission can transfer the case to a procuratorate only when it finds upon investigation that \u201cthe criminal facts are clear, and the evidence is credible and sufficient (\u72af\u7f6a\u4e8b\u5b9e\u6e05\u695a\uff0c\u8bc1\u636e\u786e\u5b9e\u3001\u5145\u5206),\u201d[55]<\/a><\/sup> which sets a two-pronged test consisting of facts and evidence. It is widely held that the first prong is a subjective requirement within the authority\u2019s discretion,[56]<\/a><\/sup> indicating the focus should be drawn to the second prong.<\/span><\/p>\n

          This standard is the same for a public security authority (police office) to transfer an ordinary case to a procuratorate, according to Art. 162 of the Criminal Procedure Law<\/em>. Accordingly, considering that the supervisory commissions have not yet issued relevant regulations, this article considers it proper to take public security authorities\u2019 rules as reference. According to the Provisions on the Procedures of Public Security Bureaus on Handling Criminal Cases<\/em>, evidence is credible and sufficient when (1) every fact determined is supported by evidence; (2) every piece of evidence that is used for determining the facts is confirmed with due diligence; and (3) the reasonable doubt has been precluded in light of the comprehensive evidence of the case.[57]<\/a><\/sup><\/span><\/p>\n

          To conclude, the supervisory commission should believe that it has adequate evidence to preclude any reasonable doubt and establish that enough evidence supports the facts.<\/span><\/p>\n

          b. Procedural Requirements<\/strong><\/span><\/h4>\n

          For the procedural side, the general rule is that a local supervisory commission has the discretion to decide on its own to transfer this case for prosecution according to Art. 11 of the Supervision Law<\/em>. However, there may be potential exceptions to that general rule when the case comes within the TIA system.<\/span><\/p>\n

          Although there is no valid rule on this point, it could be that the Supervision Measure Draft<\/em> issued by the NSC on 17 May 2021 provides a hint. According to Art. 233 of the Supervision Measure Draft<\/em>, if a local supervisory commission[58]<\/a><\/sup> proposes to investigate cases that are intended to be directed into the TIA system, the commission shall report this case to the NSC level by level for approval, which might be due to the importance of chasing fugitives.[59]<\/a><\/sup> In addition, when transferring this case for prosecution, the Opinion for Prosecution should be discussed by the supervisory committee dealing with the case before it is handed over to the procuratorate. These are higher requirements comparing with usual cases, indicating the importance of the TIA system.<\/span><\/p>\n

          3. Conclusion<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

          To conclude, the TIA system can be applied only when a public official committed, or from a criminal procedure perspective, is accused of a crime under Chapter 8 of the Criminal Law. The local<\/span> supervisory commission investigating this case must meet a high standard of proof and follow special<\/span> procedural requirements such as reporting to the NSC level by level for approval before transferring the case to a procuratorate for prosecution.<\/span><\/p>\n

          B. Prosecution Phase<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

          After a supervisory commission transferred a case to a procuratorate, the procuratorate[60]<\/a><\/sup> will take over to decide whether to initiate the TIA procedure. Under the current system, after the case meets the statutory requirements to continue under the TIA system, the procuratorate has the discretion to decide whether to continue the TIA procedure.<\/span><\/p>\n

          1. Statutory Requirements<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

          The procuratorate bears the same standard of proof as the supervisory commission does in furthering the TIA procedure. However, the procuratorate does not and will possibly not have procedural requirements such as reporting to the SPP \u2013 since the case has been reported to the top authority once, there is no need to do it again.[61]<\/a><\/sup><\/span><\/p>\n

          On the substantive side, according to Art. 176 of the Criminal Procedure Law<\/em>, the standard for the procuratorate is also \u201cthe criminal facts are clear, and the evidence is credible and sufficient.\u201d As discussed before, this is a high standard of evidence. In addition, as the name of the TIA system indicates, the procuratorate must establish that the defendant is abroad with convincing evidence.[62]<\/a><\/sup><\/span><\/p>\n

          There are no unique stipulations regarding the procedural aspect, but the relevant procuratorial committee may discuss the case. The Prosecution Rules of Procedure<\/em> mirrors the abstract procedures stipulated in the Criminal Procedure Law<\/em>.[63]<\/a><\/sup> In addition, unlike the supervisory commission system, there will possibly be no special procedural requirements for the procuratorate system for two reasons.\u00a0Firstly, the supervisory commissions are centers of the programs of chasing fugitives.[64]<\/a><\/sup> As the NSC is de facto<\/em> CCDI, the NSC would have a stronger voice on this issue than procuratorates and courts. Therefore, since the NSC, as a top-level authority, has reviewed whether to launch the TIA system, there is no need for the prosecution side to report the case back again to a top-level authority, i.e.<\/em>,\u00a0 SPP from the prosecution side. Secondly, the indication that no special procedural requirements can be drawn from the path of the special confiscation procedure under Chapter 4 of the Criminal Procedure Law. The special confiscation procedure was expected to carry similar functions as the TIA procedure,[65]<\/a><\/sup> but there are still no special procedural requirements, such as reporting, for the procuratorate to follow after its 9-year practices. That said, considering the potential importance and complexity of a case subject to the TIA system, it may be reported to the procuratorial commission\/\u68c0\u5bdf\u59d4\u5458\u4f1a of the local procuratorate to decide whether to file the prosecution.[66]<\/a><\/sup><\/span><\/p>\n

          Therefore, it is possible to believe that no special procedural requirements will be set for a procuratorate to follow before prosecuting a TIA case to a court, but the case may be discussed by the procuratorial committee to decide whether to prosecute.<\/span><\/p>\n

          2. Discretion<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

          Even if the aforementioned requirements are met, the local procuratorate still has the discretion to decide whether or not to launch a prosecution, but the factors considered in exercising this discretion are not apparent yet.<\/span><\/p>\n

          The local procuratorate has the discretion to prosecute or not. According to Art. 291 of the Criminal Procedure Law, the word authorizing the procuratorate is \u201cmay (\u53ef\u4ee5),\u201d indicating the power can be waived even if other requirements are met. However, since the rules are silent on this point and there are no completed cases, the considerations behind the reluctance to prosecute are yet unknown.<\/span><\/p>\n

          3. Conclusion<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

          To conclude, a prosecution can be filed when the substantive requirements of burden of proof are met, but the prosecutor still has discretion on whether to bring the case or not.<\/span><\/p>\n

          C. Adjudication Phase<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

          After a prosecutor files a TIA case in a court, the court will decide whether to accept this case under the TIA system. In addition, even after the TIA system starts operating, the court will terminate the TIA proceedings in certain conditions. The following parts will: <\/span><\/p>\n

            \n
          1. Explain when a court will accept a case under the TIA system; <\/span><\/li>\n
          2. Explain what a court would do after accepting a case under the TIA system; and<\/span><\/li>\n
          3. Explain when a court will terminate the TIA proceedings.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

            1. When to Accept a Case with the TIA Procedure<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

            When a case is prosecuted to a court under the TIA procedure, the court should first decide whether to accept the case under the TAI procedure.<\/span><\/p>\n

            In light of Art. 291 of the Criminal Procedure Law<\/em> and Art. 598 of the Criminal Procedure Interpretation<\/em>, there are 7 points to be met for a court to accept a TIA case, and these 7 points and the following chart present the case\u2019s results if one of the 7 points is not met.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
            <\/td>\nCategory[67]<\/a><\/sup><\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nDescription<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nResults if not Met<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
            1<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nSubject matter of the TIA system<\/span><\/td>\nWhether this case is within the scope of the TIA system<\/span><\/td>\nRemand the case to the procuratorate<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
            2<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nJurisdiction of the court<\/span><\/td>\nWhether this court has jurisdiction<\/span><\/td>\nRemand the case to the procuratorate<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
            3<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nFormality requirements<\/span><\/td>\nWhether the defendant\u2019s basic information, including a clear residence abroad and contact information, is listed<\/span><\/td>\nRequire the procuratorate to supplement the materials or information within 30 days; if the procuratorate fails to, remand the case to the procuratorate<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
            4<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nFormality requirements<\/span><\/td>\nWhether main facts that the defendant is engaged in relevant crimes are listed with evidence<\/span><\/td>\nIbid<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
            5<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nFormality requirements<\/span><\/td>\nWhether the name, identity, address, contact information, etc. of close relatives of the defendant, if any, are listed<\/span><\/td>\nIbid<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
            6<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nFormality requirements<\/span><\/td>\nWhether the type, amount, value, location, etc. of the illegal incomes and other properties involved in this case are listed with evidence<\/span><\/td>\nIbid<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
            7<\/strong><\/span><\/td>\nFormality requirements<\/span><\/td>\nWhether a list and other relevant legal requirements of seizure and freezing of illegal income and other properties involved in this case are attached<\/span><\/td>\nIbid<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

            (A List of Aspects to be Reviewed by a Court)<\/span><\/p>\n

            2. What to Do after the Acceptance<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

            A case does not stop when a court accepts it under the TIA procedure. Instead, the court must\u00a0take further actions to safeguard the defendant\u2019s rights. Once a court decided to accept the case under the TIA procedure, it undertakes further obligations of notifying the defendant.<\/span><\/p>\n

            Firstly, the court must service of process. According to Art. 292 of the Criminal Procedure Law<\/em> and Art. 600 of the Criminal Procedure Interpretation<\/em>, the court must send the summons and a copy of the indictment to the defendant. The summons shall specify the time limit for the defendant to appear before the court and the legal consequence of not appearing as required. In addition, the court must send a copy of the indictment to close relatives of the defendant with notification that they can appoint an advocate on behalf of the defendant. Neither the Criminal Procedure Law<\/em> nor the Criminal Procedure Interpretation<\/em> specified any special rights advocates enjoy in the TIA system, indicating the advocate will have the same rights as prescribed for ordinary corruption cases.[68]<\/a><\/sup><\/span><\/p>\n

            Secondly, the court should notify the defendant after reaching a judgment. According to Art. 294 of the Criminal Procedure Law<\/em>, the court should deliver the judgment to the defendant, his\/her close relatives, and his\/her advocate. If the defendant or his\/her close relatives are not satisfied with the judgment, both of them can appeal to a higher court.<\/span><\/p>\n

            3. Termination and Retrial<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

            The operation of the TIA procedure does not mean the case will keep running without any obstructions. If certain conditions occurred, the TIA procedure would be terminated, and a retrial will be granted to the defendant. To be more specific, if the defendant passes away, the defendant appears before the court or the crime decided by the court is beyond the subject matters of the TIA system, the court shall terminate the TIA procedure and grant a retrial with the defendant’s appearance in the following scenarios.<\/span><\/p>\n

            Firstly, the court shall terminate the TIA procedure if the defendant passes away. As a general rule of criminal procedure law, the court shall terminate any criminal proceeding if the defendant passes away with only one exception, and the exception is that the current proceeding will render a judgment of acquittal.[69]<\/a><\/sup> This general rule has been mirrored into a specific provision under the TIA system, i.e.<\/em>, Art. 297 of the Criminal Procedure Law<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n

            Secondly, the court shall terminate the TIA procedure and grant a retrial if the defendant appears. According to Art. 295 of the Criminal Procedure Law<\/em>, if the defendant appears, either voluntarily or involuntarily, during the trial period, the court shall stop the TIA procedure and launch a retrial; and if the defendant appears after a judgment or a decision is valid with an objection, the court shall launch a retrial.<\/span><\/p>\n

            Thirdly, the TIA should be terminated if the court finds the crime not to be a subject matter of the TIA system. According to Art. 604 of the Criminal Procedure Interpretation<\/em>, if a court intended to find the defendant guilty of a crime beyond the subject matters of the TIA system, the court should terminate the TIA proceeding before reaching a verdict.<\/span><\/p>\n

            4. Conclusion<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

            To conclude, the court will accept a case under the TIA procedure if (1) the case is within the subject matters of the TIA system, (2) the court has jurisdiction, and (3) other formality requirements are met. After accepting the case, the court further undertakes notification obligations to the defendant. In addition, the court will terminate the TIA proceedings and grant a retrial if the defendant passes away, the defendant appears before the court, or the crime decided by the court is beyond the subject matters of the TIA system.<\/span><\/p>\n

            D. Conclusion<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

            From the analysis above, a supervisory commission will investigate a crime under the Criminal Law<\/em> Chapter 8 committed by \u201ca public official.\u201d The supervisory commission will transfer the case to a prosecutor for prosecution if it (1) believes that it has adequate evidence to preclude any reasonable doubt and establishes that enough evidence supports the facts; and (2) obtains an approval after it reports this case to the NSC level by level.<\/span><\/p>\n

            After a case is transferred for prosecution, a prosecution can be filed when the substantive requirements of burden of proof are met, but the prosecutor still has discretion on whether to bring the case or not.<\/span><\/p>\n

            After the prosecution was filed, the court will accept this case with the TIA process if (1) the indicted crime is subject to the TIA system; (2) the court has jurisdiction; and (3) other formalities are met. After the court accepts the case, the process can be terminated if (1) the defendant passes away; (2) the defendant appears before the court; or (3) the crime intended to be decided by the court is beyond the subject matters of the TIA system.<\/span><\/p>\n

            For convenience, the following flowchart can serve as an illustration of the TIA system.<\/span><\/p>\n

            \"A<\/span><\/p>\n

            (A Flowchart of the TIA System by the Author)<\/span><\/p>\n

            IV. Why the TIA System was Created<\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n

            As discussed in the previous section, the TIA system is complicated. Without incentives, it is unreasonable to bring such a novel revision to the criminal procedure system \u2013 only when the TIA system can prevail over the competing methods in chasing corrupt fugitives will a policymaker bring in the system despite the high costs of so doing.<\/span><\/p>\n

            Therefore, to better understand why the Chinese government created the TIA system, the following parts will: <\/span><\/p>\n

              \n
            1. Assess the methods of chasing corrupt fugitives used prior to the TIA system and reveal their intrinsic defects as to the efficiency of pursuing corrupt fugitives; and<\/span><\/li>\n
            2. Assess whether the TIA system can help to address these defects.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

              A. Failure of Methods Prior to the TIA System<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

              As elaborated in the Lotus <\/em>case by the International Court of Justice, a state\u2019s sovereignty is limited to its own territory.[70]<\/a><\/sup> Therefore, China cannot extend its power of arresting a fugitive into another state\u2019s territory. Prior to the TIA system which is territorial by its nature, there were two main ways for China to deal with the problem, i.e.<\/em>, (1) by persuading the corrupt fugitive to appear in China voluntarily; and (2) by requesting another state to extradite the corrupt fugitive to China.[71]<\/a><\/sup> Although the Chinese government did not clearly state these two reasons,[72]<\/a><\/sup> this article argues that these two solutions have intrinsic defects, making them inadequate to deal with the comprehensive and demanding anti-corruption campaign.<\/span><\/p>\n

              1. Voluntary Appearance<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

              The voluntary appearance of the fugitive in China is the most popular approach. According to the CCDI, more than half (about 57%; 390 out of 680) of the fugitives tried in China in 2015 appeared after their voluntary surrender.[73]<\/a><\/sup> In addition, even after the TIA system was established, the NSC, SPC, SPP, MPS, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (\u201cMFA\u201d) issued an Announcement on the Urging Duty-Related Fugitives to Surrender<\/em>,[74]<\/a><\/sup> indicating the voluntary appearance approach is endorsed by the authorities. Despite its popularity, this approach has two negative aspects from the author\u2019s perspective,[75]<\/a><\/sup> i.e.<\/em>:<\/span><\/p>\n

                \n
              1. \n
                  \n
                1. \n
                    \n
                  1. The fugitive has a great deal of bargaining power in this approach; <\/span><\/li>\n
                  2. This approach is costly to the Chinese authorities; <\/span><\/li>\n
                  3. This approach runs the risk of annoying other states.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                    Firstly, this approach grants too much bargaining power to the fugitive. As indicated by its name, the voluntary appearance approach relies mainly on the fugitive\u2019s discretion. In other words, if the fugitive declines to go back to China for trial, the authority will have few alternatives to persuade the fugitive further. Some Chinese scholars proposed that the Chinese authority can persuade foreign states to launch legal proceedings against corrupt fugitives; facing trials in a foreign state, the corrupt fugitive may surrender to China to escape from such legal proceedings.[76]<\/a><\/sup> However, from the author’s perspective, such an approach cannot thoroughly resolve the defects. For example, a defendant may accept the foreign state’s jurisdiction, and stay in that state at the cost of potential punishments.<\/span><\/p>\n

                    Secondly, the voluntary appearance approach is costly for the authority both in time and finance. For the time side, like the Yang Xiuzhu case, which this article discussed initially, it took 13 years for Ms. Yang to appear in China for trial in the end voluntarily. For another example, Huang Yurong\/\u9ec4\u7389\u8363, another fugitive listed in the INTERPOL Red Notices, voluntarily appeared in China in 2015, 13 years after she fled to the United States in 2002.[77]<\/a><\/sup> For the finance side, chasing fugitives cost money. As long as the process goes on, the Chinese authority has to pay for the campaign, which may be expensive in jurisdictions like the United States, considering the attorney fees are relatively higher in these jurisdictions.[78]<\/a><\/sup><\/span><\/p>\n

                    Thirdly, the voluntary appearance approach runs the risk of annoying other states. Persuasion should not only be made through policies, such as the Announcement on Urging Duty-Related Fugitives to Surrender<\/em>, but also requires officers to discuss with corrupt fugitives in person. Considering the latter actions often occur in another state, the action may annoy the sovereignty of that state and may even potentially constitute a crime in that state. Take \u201cOperation Fox Hunt\u201d as an example. The United States Department of Justice issued a press release on 22 July 2021 that 9 individuals, including a serving Chinese prosecutor, were indicted for their participation in the \u201cOperation Fox Hunt\u201d in the United States.[79]<\/a><\/sup><\/span><\/p>\n

                    2. Extradition<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

                    The second approach taken by the Chinese government is to apply for extradition. With the international legal frameworks such as the United Nations Convention against Corruption<\/em> (\u201cUNCAC\u201d)[80]<\/a><\/sup> and United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (\u201cUNTOC\u201d),[81]<\/a><\/sup> and many bilateral agreements, it seems easy for China to seek extradition for a corrupt fugitive. However, that is not the truth because: <\/span><\/p>\n

                      \n
                    1. The extradition under international legal frameworks is hard to enforce, and\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n
                    2. Chinese bilateral treaties with other jurisdictions cannot cope with a large number of fugitives suspected of corruption crimes.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                      Firstly, the international legal frameworks can hardly be enforced. Even though the UNCAC incorporates Art. 44 to specifically deal with extradition issues, Art. 44(6) leaves spaces for states to assert that their extradition is contingent upon treaties.[82]<\/a><\/sup> By so stating, many states have de facto opted out of the system by conditioning extradition on bilateral treaties,[83]<\/a><\/sup> which, as this article will explain later, makes it hard for China to seek extradition.[84]<\/a><\/sup> As for the UNTOC, Art. 16 also leaves spaces for converting an extradition application according to the UNTOC into that according to bilateral treaties.[85]<\/a><\/sup><\/span><\/p>\n

                      Secondly, the bilateral treaties between China and other jurisdictions are not adequate to address the extradition needs. Even though the extradition treaties China reaches with other countries have been increased to 59 up to date,[86]<\/a><\/sup> China has not reached any treaty with many Western countries, among which are the United States, Canada, and Australia. Considering the tense relationship between China and these three countries, China can hardly reach such treaties in the short or medium term. However, researchers have pointed out that Western countries are the most popular destinations of corrupt Chinese fugitives,[87]<\/a><\/sup> and the top 3 favorite destinations are accidentally the United States, Canada, and Australia,[88]<\/a><\/sup> creating difficulties for the Chinese authorities to apply for extradition.[89]<\/a><\/sup><\/span><\/p>\n

                      3. Conclusion<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

                      To conclude, the voluntary appearance and extradition approaches are two main ways for the Chinese authority to pursue corrupt fugitives prior to the TIA system. Although the Chinese government did not explicitly comment on these two approaches, the author contends that they can hardly fulfill their objectives because (1) the voluntary appearance approach assigns the fugitive with too much bargaining power, is costly both in time and finance, and runs the risk of annoying other states; and (2) the extradition approaches can hardly be applied due to the inefficiency of international legal frameworks and lack of bilateral extradition treaties.<\/span><\/p>\n

                      B. TIA System as a Response to Defects<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

                      The TIA system is a possible solution to solve the aforementioned defects and can even bring new benefits. Under the TIA system: <\/span><\/p>\n

                        \n
                      1. \n
                          \n
                        1. The Lotus<\/em> limitation on state sovereignty is avoided; <\/span><\/li>\n
                        2. The unbalanced bargaining power and costly proceedings under the voluntary appearance approach are better addressed; <\/span><\/li>\n
                        3. The extradition application is no longer required; and <\/span><\/li>\n
                        4. The Chinese government can more easily recover a fugitive\u2019s assets overseas.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                          Firstly, the TIA system is free from the Lotus<\/em> limitation. The TIA system, by its nature, is a domestic judicial system that targets a Chinese citizen\u2019s action that brings substantial effects to China, which is an action not prohibited by international law.[90]<\/a><\/sup> It is beyond doubt that China can hold such a domestic proceeding as furtherance of its sovereignty. In addition, the risk of annoying other states is also mitigated since no actions will be taken in the territory of another state.<\/span><\/p>\n

                          Secondly, the TIA system can solve the defects met by the voluntary appearance approach. As mentioned above, the defects of the voluntary appearance approach are the unbalanced bargaining power between the fugitive and Chinese authorities, the high cost, and the risk of annoying other states. For the prong of bargaining power, the TIA system reserves the power of initiating the process to the authority as it does in other ordinary prosecution procedures. In addition, the fugitive would be notified by the court, and the court would adjudicate this case according to the law. Therefore, better balanced-bargaining power is preserved under the TIA system. For the prong of cost, the TIA system can save time and money. Under the TIA system, no consent of the fugitive is required for the start of the procedure, indicating many years for persuasion may be possibly saved; in addition, since the length of a case would be considerably shortened, the cost of these actions would be lower, especially considering most of the procedures are conducted in China, a familiar jurisdiction for the authorities.<\/span><\/p>\n

                          Thirdly, the TIA system can solve the defects met by the extradition approach. The defects under such an approach can find their nature in international cooperation. In other words, every defect is tied to the limitation of one state\u2019s territorial sovereignty. Under the TIA system, the appearance of the fugitive is no more necessary for a criminal trial, making it unnecessary to obtain the fugitive from other states through extradition.[91]<\/a><\/sup><\/span><\/p>\n

                          Fourthly, in addition to solving intrinsic defects of the prior approaches, the TIA system also makes it easier for the Chinese government to recover overseas assets of the fugitive but research shows the process is likely to be complicated. The Chinese government may rely on Article 57(3) of UNCAC, under which it can request another state party to return assets to China. UNCAC generally requires that the requesting state (China) have rendered a final judgment unless the relevant state party has waived that requirement.[92]<\/a><\/sup> Additionally, the Chinese government may rely on a bilateral criminal judicial assistance treaty. Those do not usually condition asset recovery upon a valid judgment, but that will depend on local law. Also, the language in the treaties generally gives the local court the discretion to transfer assets to the requesting state. Local legislation may also involve complicated procedures. So the TIA system will better enable the Chinese government to recover overseas assets, but the ease of recovery will depend on the jurisdiction.<\/span><\/p>\n

                          C. Conclusion<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

                          To conclude, in the author\u2019s view, a TIA system is necessary because it can solve defects of other prior approaches and contribute to the pursuit of overseas assets of the fugitive.<\/span><\/p>\n

                          V. The TIA System and Right to be Present at Trial<\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n

                          No system is perfect, and the TIA system is no exception. As the name \u201ctrial-in-absentia\u201d indicates, the TIA system would encounter some legitimate questions. Among them, the most controversial question is whether the defendant\u2019s right to be present at trial can be safeguarded under such a trial-in-absentia system.<\/span><\/p>\n

                          To better address this fundamental question of human rights, this section will:<\/span><\/p>\n

                            \n
                          1. Clarify the contents of the right to be present; and <\/span><\/li>\n
                          2. Analyze the TIA system under the defendant\u2019s right to be present.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                            A. The Right to be Present at Trial<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

                            The right to be present at trial is \u201ca precondition for the realization of a fair trial,\u201d[93]<\/a><\/sup> which is a fundamental human right enshrined under Art. 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[94]<\/a><\/sup> The right to be present at trial is also enumerated as a human right under many influential human rights covenants, such as Art. 14.3(d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (\u201cICCPR\u201d),[95]<\/a><\/sup> Art. 6(3)(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights,[96]<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0etc. Even though China is not a party to the ICCPR,[97]<\/a><\/sup> considering ICCPR reflects customary international law in the field of human rights, the following analysis of the right\u2019s contents will mainly focus on the jurisprudence of ICCPR and other influential human rights agreements.<\/span><\/p>\n

                            The following parts will:<\/span><\/p>\n

                              \n
                            1. Clarify that the presence at trial is both a right and a duty, and <\/span><\/li>\n
                            2. Discuss when the right to be present at trial is limited.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                              1. Presence at Trial is both a Right and a Duty<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

                              Before conducting a substantive analysis of the right to be present at trial, the nature of the presence at trial should be clarified.<\/span><\/p>\n

                              Firstly, the presence at trial is a right of the defendant. As an aspect of the right to a fair trial, the presence at trial has long been recognized as a human right, and it was codified into the ICCPR for the first time in history. Art. 14.3(d) of the ICCPR states that the defendant has the right \u201c[t]o be tried in his presence.\u201d[98]<\/a><\/sup> Even though the ICCPR does not use the terminology of the right to present at trial, the Human Rights Committee (\u201cHRC\u201d) confirmed the equal meaning of the two in later cases.[99]<\/a><\/sup><\/span><\/p>\n

                              Secondly, the presence at trial is a duty of the defendant. Despite the well-founded basis to argue the presence at trial is a right, there is an escalating voice that the present at trial is a duty as well.[100]<\/a><\/sup> As observed by the European Court of Human Rights in Poitrimol v. France<\/em>, which is a leading case in this field, \u201ca defendant should appear \u2026 because of the need to verify the accuracy of his statements and compare them with those of the victim \u2014 whose interests need to be protected \u2014 and of the witnesses.\u201d[101]<\/a><\/sup> This statement emphasized the opposite side of the present against a mere right of the defendant, and it revealed that the public interest should be weighed. Therefore, the author contends that being present at trial is also a duty of the defendant.<\/span><\/p>\n

                              To conclude, in the view of this author, being present at trial is a right of the defendant to protect his own interests and a duty of the defendant in the public interest.<\/span><\/p>\n

                              2. Limitation on the Right to be Present at Trial<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

                              Since presence at trial conveys both a right and a defendant’s duty, whether the right should be preserved is upon the balance of private and public interests.[102]<\/a><\/sup> As numerous cases revealed, the defendant\u2019s right to be present at trial can be waived if there is compelling public interest with due process.[103]<\/a><\/sup><\/span><\/p>\n

                              As elaborated by the HRC in Mbenge v. Zaire<\/em>, a leading case in this field, \u201cproceedings in absentia are in some circumstances \u2026 permissible in the interest of the proper administration of justice.\u201d[104]<\/a><\/sup> As for a specified circumstance, the HRC pointed out that when the defendant declines to exercise the right to be present at trial after being informed of the proceedings sufficiently in advance.[105]<\/a><\/sup> In other words, when the defendant waived his\/her right to be present, proceedings in absentia are consistent with the human rights requirements. In addition, the HRC further pointed out in Maleki v. Italy<\/em> that the due process requirements include that a defendant is \u201centitled to a retrial in his presence when [the defendant is] apprehended in [the forum state].\u201d[106]<\/a><\/sup> In other words, the accused’s appearance can reverse the proceedings in absentia even if a valid judgment has been rendered.[107]<\/a><\/sup><\/span><\/p>\n

                              To conclude, in the author\u2019s view, the right of a defendant to be present at trial is not violated in proceedings in absentia if (1) the proceedings are for the public interest; (2) the defendant refused to appear after being informed of the proceedings; and (3) the defendant is entitled to a retrial once s\/he appears in the forum state.<\/span><\/p>\n

                              B.\u00a0 TIA System & Human Rights<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

                              Under the TIA system, all three requirements are met for limitations on the defendant\u2019s right to be present at trial. Therefore, in the view of this author<\/span>, the TIA system complies with human rights requirements.<\/span><\/p>\n

                              Firstly, there are compelling public interests to pursue an anti-corruption campaign. As noted by Professor Peters, corruption is a violation of international human rights.[108]<\/a><\/sup> Therefore, it is reasonable for a government to protect its citizens from human rights violations caused by corruption.<\/span><\/p>\n

                              Secondly, the TIA system can only work after the defendant refuses to be present after due process. Recalling the operation mode of the TIA system, the court should send the summons and a copy of the indictment to the defendant, and the summons\u00a0shall specify the time limit for the defendant to appear before the court and the legal consequence of not appearing as required according to Art. 293 of the Criminal Procedure Law<\/em> and Art. 600 of the Criminal Procedure Interpretation<\/em>. If the defendant appears, the TIA procedure would be terminated according to Art. 295 of the Criminal Procedure Law. Therefore, the negative waiver of the right after due process has been fulfilled.<\/span><\/p>\n

                              Thirdly, the defendant is entitled to a retrial once appearing in China. Recalling the operation mode of the TIA system, if the defendant appears, either voluntarily or involuntarily, during the trial period, the court shall stop the TIA procedure and launch a retrial; and if the defendant appears after a judgment or a decision is valid with an objection, the court shall launch a retrial according to Art. 295 of the Criminal Procedure Law.<\/span><\/p>\n

                              To conclude, the TIA system has fulfilled all three requirements to launch proceedings in absentia without violating the defendant\u2019s right to be present at trial.<\/span><\/p>\n

                              C. Conclusion<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

                              The right of the defendant to be present at trial allows proceedings in absentia only when (1) the proceedings are for the public interest; (2) the defendant refused to be present after being informed of the proceedings; and (3) the defendant is entitled to a retrial once s\/he appears in the forum state. According to the background of the TIA system, Arts. 293 and 295 of the Criminal Procedure Law and Art. 600 of the Criminal Procedure Interpretation, the TIA system fulfills the requirements to launch proceedings in absentia against a defendant.<\/span><\/p>\n

                              VI. Conclusion<\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n

                              A state\u2019s territory does not limit corruption, and officers accused of corruption from China may flee abroad to escape from the authority bring them to justice. Since Mr. Xi Jinping was elected as General Secretary of CPC in 2012, a nationwide anti-corruption campaign calls for a novel TIA system to deal with corrupt fugitives, and the TAI system finally came out along with the revision on the\u00a0Criminal Procedure Law<\/em> in 2018.<\/span><\/p>\n

                              Starting with the investigation phase by supervisory commissions, which were newly created in 2018 along with the Amendment to the Constitution, only corrupt crimes fall within the scope of the TIA system; in addition, the local supervisory commission would have to report this case level by level to the NSC for approval before handing over this case to a prosecutor. After the prosecutor decides to file a case before a court, the court will decide whether to accept this case under the TIA system and notify the defendant after accepting the case. If the defendant passes away or appears, or the court found the crime was outside of the scope of the TIA system, the TIA proceedings would be terminated by the court, and a retrial would be granted on application.<\/span><\/p>\n

                              Despite its complexity, the TIA system, in the author\u2019s view, may cure the intrinsic defects embedded in other methods for the authority to pursue corrupt fugitives. Prior to the TIA system, the authority tends to either wait for the fugitive voluntarily or seek extradition. However, the voluntary appearance approach assigns the fugitive with too much bargaining power, is costly both in time and finance, and runs the risk of annoying other states. The extradition approaches can hardly be applied due to the inefficiency of international legal frameworks and the lack of bilateral extradition treaties. With the TIA system, these intrinsic defects can be cured. The system may even bring more benefits to the Chinese authorities, such as better enabling the recovery of overseas assets of the corrupt fugitive.<\/span><\/p>\n

                              As its name indicated, the TIA system would encounter criticisms based on the human rights to be present at trial. However, in the author\u2019s view, such a right is not absolute.\u00a0 A departure from the right can be justified if there are compelling public interests and due diligence is well preserved. Behind the TIA system lies compelling public interest to counter corruption which is a violation of human rights. In addition, the rules of the TIA system conditions the operation of the TIA system on the court\u2019s notification of the defendant, which is consistent with the due process requirements.<\/span><\/p>\n

                              The author has contended that the TIA system works well and complies with international human rights law in theory, but a theory is not the end of a system. It is not even the beginning of the end, but it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning. With more emphasis on pursuing fugitives, the author believes there will be more and more cases in this field, and those practices can test if the TIA system will work as the Chinese authorities expect.<\/span><\/p>\n

                                \n
                              1. Chen Liang is a J.D.\/J.M. candidate at Peking University School of Transnational Law. Professor Susan Finder advised the author, and the author is immensely grateful for Professor Finder\u2019s kind support. The author also thanks Professor Zhao Chenguang (\u8d75\u6668\u5149) Professor Chen Xuan (\u9648\u7487), Ms. Wang Zhipei (\u738b\u4e4b\u9708), Mr. Shao Yang (\u90b5\u9633) and other legal professionals who offered timely support. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              2. See Case Concerning the Embezzlement and Corruption of Yang Xiuzhu\/\u6768\u79c0\u73e0\u8d2a\u6c61\u3001\u53d7\u8d3f\u6848, Chu No. 71 Criminal Judgement of Zhe 01 (Intermediate People\u2019s Court of Zhejiang Province Hangzhou Municipality, 2017)\/\u6d59\u6c5f\u7701\u676d\u5dde\u5e02\u4e2d\u7ea7\u4eba\u6c11\u6cd5\u9662\uff082017\uff09\u6d5901\u5211\u521d71\u53f7\u5211\u4e8b\u5224\u51b3\u4e66. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              3. See Yang Xiaodu\/\u6768\u6653\u6e21, \u201cReport of the National Supervisory Commission on the International Anti-Corruption Works of Chasing Fugitives\/\u56fd\u5bb6\u76d1\u5bdf\u59d4\u5458\u4f1a\u5173\u4e8e\u5f00\u5c55\u53cd\u8150\u8d25\u56fd\u9645\u8ffd\u9003\u8ffd\u8d43\u5de5\u4f5c\u60c5\u51b5\u7684\u62a5\u544a,\u201d CCDI<\/em>, 10 August 2020 <https:\/\/www.ccdi.gov.cn\/toutiao\/202008\/t20200810_223555.html&gt<\/a>; accessed 1 June 2021. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              4. \u201cCriminal Procedure Law of the People\u2019s Republic of China\/\u4e2d\u534e\u4eba\u6c11\u5171\u548c\u56fd\u5211\u4e8b\u8bc9\u8bbc\u6cd5,\u201d revised 26 October 2018. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              5. According to Art. 291 of the revised Criminal Procedure Law<\/em>, the TIA system can be applied to three kinds of crimes, i.e.<\/em>, corruption crimes, national security crimes, and terrorist crimes if other requirements are met. However, in light of this article’s purpose, the term \u201cTIA system\u201d in this article refers only to the system applicable to corruption crimes. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              6. See \u201cDecision of the Standing Committee of the National People\u2019s Congress to Amend the Criminal Procedure Law\/\u5168\u56fd\u4eba\u6c11\u4ee3\u8868\u5927\u4f1a\u5e38\u52a1\u59d4\u5458\u4f1a\u5173\u4e8e\u4fee\u6539\u300a\u4e2d\u534e\u4eba\u6c11\u5171\u548c\u56fd\u5211\u4e8b\u8bc9\u8bbc\u6cd5\u300b\u7684\u51b3\u5b9a,\u201d 26 October 2018. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              7. See \u201cRules of Criminal Procedure for People\u2019s Procuratorates\/\u4eba\u6c11\u68c0\u5bdf\u9662\u5211\u4e8b\u8bc9\u8bbc\u89c4\u5219,\u201d Gao Jian Fa Shizi [2019] No. 4\/\u9ad8\u68c0\u53d1\u91ca\u5b57\u30142019\u30154\u53f7, 30 December 2019, Chapter 12 Section 3. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              8. See \u201cInterpretation of the SPC on the Application of the Criminal Procedure Law\u6700\u9ad8\u4eba\u6c11\u6cd5\u9662\u5173\u4e8e\u9002\u7528\u300a\u4e2d\u534e\u4eba\u6c11\u5171\u548c\u56fd\u5211\u4e8b\u8bc9\u8bbc\u6cd5\u300b\u7684\u89e3\u91ca\/\u201d, Fa Shi [2021] No. 1\/\u6cd5\u91ca\u30142021\u30151\u53f7, 26 January 2021, Chapter 24. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              9. See \u201cNotification on Seeking Public Opinions on the Implementing Measures of the Supervision Law (Draft for Comments)\/\u5173\u4e8e\u300a\u4e2d\u534e\u4eba\u6c11\u5171\u548c\u56fd\u76d1\u5bdf\u6cd5\u5b9e\u65bd\u6761\u4f8b\uff08\u5f81\u6c42\u610f\u89c1\u7a3f\uff09\u300b\u516c\u5f00\u5f81\u6c42\u610f\u89c1\u7684\u901a\u77e5,\u201d CCDI<\/em>, 17 May 2021 <https:\/\/www.ccdi.gov.cn\/djfg\/fgsy\/202105\/t20210520_242311.html&gt<\/a>;, accessed 1 June 2021. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              10. See Supervision Measure Draft<\/em> Art. 233. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              11. Zhang Jun\/\u5f20\u519b, Attorney-General of the SPP, disclosed in his annual report to the National People\u2019s Congress that the first case under the TIA system had been launched in 2020. However, the case is still ongoing, and there is no more information about this case apart from the abstract disclosure. For Zhang Jun\u2019s disclosure, see \u201cWorking Report of the People\u2019s Supreme Procuratorate (Excerpt)\/\u6700\u9ad8\u4eba\u6c11\u68c0\u5bdf\u9662\u5de5\u4f5c\u62a5\u544a\uff08\u6458\u8981\uff09,\u201d People\u2019s Daily\/\u4eba\u6c11\u65e5\u62a5<\/em>, 9 March 2021, at 3. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              12. \u201c\u65b0\u5f62\u52bf\u4e0b\uff0c\u6211\u4eec\u515a\u9762\u4e34\u7740\u8bb8\u591a\u4e25\u5cfb\u6311\u6218\uff0c\u515a\u5185\u5b58\u5728\u7740\u8bb8\u591a\u4e9f\u5f85\u89e3\u51b3\u7684\u95ee\u9898\u3002\u5c24\u5176\u662f\u4e00\u4e9b\u515a\u5458\u5e72\u90e8\u4e2d\u53d1\u751f\u7684\u8d2a\u6c61\u8150\u8d25\u2026\u2026\u95ee\u9898\uff0c\u5fc5\u987b\u4e0b\u5927\u6c14\u529b\u89e3\u51b3\u3002\u201d See Xie Huanchi\/\u8c22\u73af\u9a70, \u201cPeople\u2019s Aspiration for a Better Life is Our Goal\/\u4eba\u6c11\u5bf9\u7f8e\u597d\u751f\u6d3b\u7684\u5411\u5f80 \u5c31\u662f\u6211\u4eec\u7684\u594b\u6597\u76ee\u6807,\u201d People\u2019s Daily\/\u4eba\u6c11\u65e5\u62a5<\/em>, 16 November 2012, at 4. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              13. See Jiang Jie\/\u59dc\u6d01, \u201cImportant News about the Anti-Corruption Campaign since the 18th National Congress of the Party (New Practices of State Governance)\/\u515a\u7684\u5341\u516b\u5927\u4ee5\u6765\u6b63\u98ce\u53cd\u8150\u8981\u95fb\u5f55\uff08\u6cbb\u56fd\u7406\u653f\u65b0\u5b9e\u8df5\uff09,\u201d People\u2019s Daily\/\u4eba\u6c11\u65e5\u62a5<\/em>, 3 February 2016, at 1 and 11. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              14. \u201c\u4e25\u683c\u9075\u5b88\u5ec9\u6d01\u4ece\u653f\u6709\u5173\u89c4\u5b9a\u201d\u3002See CPC Central Politburo, \u201cEight Provisions on Improving the Working Style and Keeping Close Contact with the People\/\u5173\u4e8e\u6539\u8fdb\u5de5\u4f5c\u4f5c\u98ce\u3001\u5bc6\u5207\u8054\u7cfb\u7fa4\u4f17\u7684\u516b\u9879\u89c4\u5b9a,\u201d 4 November 2012. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              15. Legally speaking, supervision commissions of the Party, including the CCDI, are organs of the Party but not departments of the State. However, there is a long tradition that the supervision commission of the Party works together (\u5408\u7f72\u529e\u516c) with the State\u2019s supervision departments, such as the SPP. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              16. See \u201cCCDI: Li Chuncheng is Suspected of Seriously Violating Disciplines, and is under Investigation by the Party\/\u4e2d\u7eaa\u59d4\uff1a\u674e\u6625\u57ce\u6d89\u5acc\u4e25\u91cd\u8fdd\u7eaa \u6b63\u63a5\u53d7\u7ec4\u7ec7\u8c03\u67e5,\u201d Xinhua Net<\/em>, 6 December 2012 <http:\/\/www.xinhuanet.com\/\/politics\/2012-12\/06\/c_113923447.htm&gt<\/a>; accessed 30 April 2021. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              17. See \u201cLi Chuncheng, Former Deputy Secretary of the CPC Sichuan Provincial Committee, was Sentenced to 13 Years in Prison during the First Instance\/\u56db\u5ddd\u7701\u59d4\u539f\u526f\u4e66\u8bb0\u674e\u6625\u57ce\u4e00\u5ba1\u88ab\u5224\u5904\u6709\u671f\u5f92\u521113\u5e74,\u201d SPP<\/em>, 13 October 2015 <https:\/\/www.spp.gov.cn\/zdgz\/201510\/t20151013_105756.shtml&gt<\/a>; Accessed 30 April 2021. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              18. For the full mandates of supervision commissions of the Party, please see \u201cConstitution of the Communist Party of China\/\u4e2d\u56fd\u5171\u4ea7\u515a\u7ae0\u7a0b,\u201d amended 24 October 2017, Art. 46. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              19. \u201c\u53cd\u8150\u8d25\u6597\u4e89\u5f62\u52bf\u4f9d\u7136\u4e25\u5cfb\uff0c\u4eba\u6c11\u7fa4\u4f17\u8fd8\u6709\u8bb8\u591a\u4e0d\u6ee1\u610f\u7684\u5730\u65b9\u3002\u2026\u2026\u53cd\u8150\u8d25\u6597\u4e89\u662f\u4e00\u9879\u957f\u671f\u7684\u3001\u590d\u6742\u7684\u3001\u8270\u5de8\u7684\u4efb\u52a1\u3002\u2026\u2026\u6211\u4eec\u8981\u575a\u5b9a\u51b3\u5fc3\uff0c\u6709\u8150\u5fc5\u53cd\u3001\u6709\u8d2a\u5fc5\u8083\uff0c\u4e0d\u65ad\u94f2\u9664\u8150\u8d25\u73b0\u8c61\u6ecb\u751f\u8513\u5ef6\u7684\u571f\u58e4\uff0c\u4ee5\u5b9e\u9645\u6210\u6548\u53d6\u4fe1\u4e8e\u6c11\u3002\u201d See Xi Jinping, Xi Jinping on State Governance\/\u4e60\u8fd1\u5e73\u8c08\u6cbb\u56fd\u7406\u653f<\/em> (Foreign Language Press\/\u5916\u6587\u51fa\u7248\u793e, 2014) 386. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              20. \u201c\u5065\u5168\u60e9\u6cbb\u548c\u9884\u9632\u8150\u8d25\u4f53\u7cfb\u3002\u201d See CPC Central Committee, \u201cDecision of the CPC Central Committee on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reform\/\u4e2d\u5171\u4e2d\u592e\u5173\u4e8e\u5168\u9762\u6df1\u5316\u6539\u9769\u82e5\u5e72\u91cd\u5927\u95ee\u9898\u7684\u51b3\u5b9a,\u201d 12 November 2013. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              21. See CPC Central Committee, \u201cWorking Plan for Establishing and Improving the System of Punishing and Preventing Corruption from 2013 to 2017\/\u5efa\u7acb\u5065\u5168\u60e9\u6cbb\u548c\u9884\u9632\u8150\u8d25\u4f53\u7cfb2013-2017\u5e74\u5de5\u4f5c\u89c4\u5212,\u201d 25 December 2013. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              22. See \u201cCPC Central Committee Decided to Expel Xu Caihou from the Party\/\u4e2d\u5171\u4e2d\u592e\u51b3\u5b9a\u7ed9\u4e88\u5f90\u624d\u539a\u5f00\u9664\u515a\u7c4d\u5904\u5206,\u201d CCDI<\/em>, 30 June 2014 <https:\/\/www.ccdi.gov.cn\/yaowen\/201406\/t20140630_132353.html&gt<\/a>; accessed 27 May 2021. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              23. See \u201cCPC Central Committee Decided to Investigate Zhou Yongkang for his Serious Violations of Disciplines\/\u4e2d\u5171\u4e2d\u592e\u51b3\u5b9a\u5bf9\u5468\u6c38\u5eb7\u4e25\u91cd\u8fdd\u7eaa\u95ee\u9898\u7acb\u6848\u5ba1\u67e5,\u201d CCDI<\/em>, 29 July 2014 <https:\/\/www.ccdi.gov.cn\/yaowen\/201407\/t20140730_132628.html&gt<\/a>; accessed 27 May 2021. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              24. See \u201cCPC Central Committee Decided to Expel Ling Jihua from the Party, Remove him from Public Office, and Transfer him to Judicial Organs for Dealing with his Suspected Crimes\/\u4e2d\u5171\u4e2d\u592e\u51b3\u5b9a\u7ed9\u4e88\u4ee4\u8ba1\u5212\u5f00\u9664\u515a\u7c4d\u5f00\u9664\u516c\u804c\u5904\u5206 \u5c06\u4ee4\u8ba1\u5212\u6d89\u5acc\u72af\u7f6a\u95ee\u9898\u53ca\u7ebf\u7d22\u79fb\u9001\u53f8\u6cd5\u673a\u5173\u4f9d\u6cd5\u5904\u7406,\u201d CCDI<\/em>, 20 July 2015 <https:\/\/www.ccdi.gov.cn\/scdc\/zggb\/djcf\/201607\/t20160704_115989.html&gt<\/a>; accessed 27 May 2021. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              25. Lin Yan\/\u6797\u5f66, \u201cConstitutional Method for the National Supervisory System Reform from Perspective of Four-Fold Structure of One Government, Two Courts System\/\u4ece\u201c\u4e00\u5e9c\u4e24\u9662\u201d\u5236\u7684\u56db\u5143\u7ed3\u6784\u8bba\u56fd\u5bb6\u76d1\u5bdf\u4f53\u5236\u6539\u9769\u7684\u5408\u5baa\u6027\u8def\u5f84,\u201d 3 Law Review\/\u6cd5\u5b66\u8bc4\u8bba 163 (2017). \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              26. The Ministry of Supervision was working together with the CCDI. See \u201cNotification of the State Council on Institutional Framework\/\u56fd\u52a1\u9662\u5173\u4e8e\u673a\u6784\u8bbe\u7f6e\u7684\u901a\u77e5,\u201d Guo Fa [1998] No. 5\/\u56fd\u53d1\u30141998\u30155\u53f7, 29 May 1998. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              27. See \u201cDecision of the Standing Committee of the National People\u2019s Congress on Carrying out the Pilot Program of Reforming the National Supervision Mechanism in Beijing Municipality, Shanxi Province, and Zhejiang Province\/\u5168\u56fd\u4eba\u6c11\u4ee3\u8868\u5927\u4f1a\u5e38\u52a1\u59d4\u5458\u4f1a\u5173\u4e8e\u5728\u5317\u4eac\u5e02\u3001\u5c71\u897f\u7701\u3001\u6d59\u6c5f\u7701\u5f00\u5c55\u56fd\u5bb6\u76d1\u5bdf\u4f53\u5236\u6539\u9769\u8bd5\u70b9\u5de5\u4f5c\u7684\u51b3\u5b9a,\u201d 26 December 2016, Art. 1. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              28. See \u201cDecision of the Standing Committee of the National People\u2019s Congress on Carrying out the Pilot Program of Reforming the National Supervision Mechanism in Beijing Municipality, Shanxi Province, and Zhejiang Province\/\u5168\u56fd\u4eba\u6c11\u4ee3\u8868\u5927\u4f1a\u5e38\u52a1\u59d4\u5458\u4f1a\u5173\u4e8e\u5728\u5317\u4eac\u5e02\u3001\u5c71\u897f\u7701\u3001\u6d59\u6c5f\u7701\u5f00\u5c55\u56fd\u5bb6\u76d1\u5bdf\u4f53\u5236\u6539\u9769\u8bd5\u70b9\u5de5\u4f5c\u7684\u51b3\u5b9a,\u201d 26 December 2016, Art. 1. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              29. There is no explicit constitutional authority for the NPC Standing Committee to implement the pilots either in certain areas, such as Beijing, Shanxi, and Zhejiang, or in the whole state, but such authority can be inferred from Art. 13 of the Legislation Law of the People\u2019s Republic of China. See Zhu Fuhui\/\u6731\u798f\u60e0 and Zhang Jinbang\/\u5f20\u664b\u90a6, \u201cAcademic Elaborations of the Supervision System Reform and Constitutional Amendment\/\u76d1\u5bdf\u4f53\u5236\u6539\u9769\u4e0e\u5baa\u6cd5\u4fee\u6539\u4e4b\u5b66\u5386\u9610\u91ca,\u201d 44(3) Journal of Sichuan Normal University (Social Sciences Edition)\/\u56db\u5ddd\u5e08\u8303\u5927\u5b66\u5b66\u62a5\uff08\u793e\u4f1a\u79d1\u5b66\u7248\uff09 5 (2017). \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              30. See \u201cDecision of the Standing Committee of the National People\u2019s Congress on Promoting the Pilot Program on the National Supervisory System Reform all over the Country\/\u5168\u56fd\u4eba\u6c11\u4ee3\u8868\u5927\u4f1a\u5e38\u52a1\u59d4\u5458\u4f1a\u5173\u4e8e\u5728\u5168\u56fd\u5404\u5730\u63a8\u5f00\u56fd\u5bb6\u76d1\u5bdf\u4f53\u5236\u6539\u9769\u8bd5\u70b9\u5de5\u4f5c\u7684\u51b3\u5b9a,\u201d 4 November 2017. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              31. See \u201cConstitution of the People\u2019s Republic of China\/\u4e2d\u534e\u4eba\u6c11\u5171\u548c\u56fd\u5baa\u6cd5,\u201d amended 11 March 2018, Arts. 123-127. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              32. \u201c\u540c\u4e2d\u592e\u7eaa\u5f8b\u68c0\u67e5\u59d4\u5458\u4f1a\u5408\u7f72\u529e\u516c\uff0c\u5c65\u884c\u7eaa\u68c0\u3001\u76d1\u5bdf\u4e24\u9879\u804c\u8d23\uff0c\u5b9e\u884c\u4e00\u5957\u5de5\u4f5c\u673a\u6784\u3001\u4e24\u4e2a\u673a\u5173\u540d\u79f0\u3002\u201d See CPC Central Committee, \u201cPlan on Deepening the Reform of the Party and State Institutes\/\u6df1\u5316\u515a\u548c\u56fd\u5bb6\u673a\u6784\u6539\u9769\u65b9\u6848,\u201d 21 March 2018. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              33. \u201c\u5404\u7ea7\u7eaa\u59d4\u76d1\u59d4\u5168\u9762\u8d2f\u5f7b\u5408\u7f72\u529e\u516c\u8981\u6c42\u201d\u3002 See Zhao Leji, \u201cFaithfully Perform the Duties Given by the Party and the Constitution, and Strive to Achieve High-Quality Development of Discipline Inspection and Supervision in the New Era\/\u5fe0\u5b9e\u5c65\u884c\u515a\u7ae0\u548c\u5baa\u6cd5\u8d4b\u4e88\u7684\u804c\u8d23 \u52aa\u529b\u5b9e\u73b0\u65b0\u65f6\u4ee3\u7eaa\u68c0\u76d1\u5bdf\u5de5\u4f5c\u9ad8\u8d28\u91cf\u53d1\u5c55,\u201d CCDI<\/em>, 11 January 2019 <https:\/\/www.ccdi.gov.cn\/toutiao\/201902\/t20190220_188859.html&gt<\/a>; accessed 2 June 2021. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              34. The exact date when the proposal was fully implemented was not clear, but it should be before Mr. Zhao\u2019s report on 11 January 2019. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              35. The supervision power was vested upon the Ministry of Supervision, the National Bureau of Corruption Prevention, and the General Bureau of Anti-Corruption and Anti-Bribery. The first two departments are both within the administration system while the latter is within the prosecution system. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              36. See \u201cCommuniqu\u00e9 of the CPC 18th CCDI 3rd Plenary Meeting\/\u4e2d\u56fd\u5171\u4ea7\u515a\u7b2c\u5341\u516b\u5c4a\u4e2d\u592e\u7eaa\u5f8b\u68c0\u67e5\u59d4\u5458\u4f1a\u7b2c\u4e09\u6b21\u5168\u4f53\u4f1a\u8bae\u516c\u62a5,\u201d 15 January 2014. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              37. See Zhang Shengjun\/\u5f20\u80dc\u519b and Wang Zhuo\/\u738b\u5353, \u201cRemarkable Progress has been Made in Internationally Pursuing Fugitives and Recovering Assets\/\u53cd\u8150\u8d25\u56fd\u9645\u8ffd\u9003\u8ffd\u8d43\u5de5\u4f5c\u6210\u6548\u663e\u8457,\u201d CCDI<\/em>, 12 August 2020 <https:\/\/www.ccdi.gov.cn\/toutiao\/202008\/t20200812_223638.html&gt<\/a>; accessed 4 June 2021. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              38. See Cui Xiaosu\/\u5d14\u5c0f\u7c9f, \u201cHuang Shuxian was Appointed to be Responsible of the Office of Internationally Chasing Fugitives and Recovering Assets\/\u9ec4\u6811\u8d24\u4efb\u4e2d\u592e\u53cd\u8150\u8d25\u534f\u8c03\u5c0f\u7ec4\u56fd\u9645\u8ffd\u9003\u8ffd\u8d43\u5de5\u4f5c\u529e\u516c\u5ba4\u8d1f\u8d23\u4eba,\u201d CPC News<\/em>, 11 October 2014 <http:\/\/renshi.people.com.cn\/n\/2014\/1011\/c139617-25809764.html&gt<\/a>; accessed 5 May 2021. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              39. See Peng Xinlin\/\u5f6d\u65b0\u6797, \u201cTaking \u2018Hunt Down Foxes\u2019 and \u2018Take Out Tigers and Swat Flies\u2019 Together to Create a Closed Loop during Anti-Corruption Campaign\/\u2018\u730e\u72d0\u2019\u4e0e\u2018\u6253\u864e\u62cd\u8747\u2019\u5e76\u4e3e\u6253\u9020\u53cd\u8150\u8d25\u6597\u4e89\u95ed\u73af,\u201d Procuratorial Daily<\/em>, 31 March 2020, at 8. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              40. See \u201cThe \u2018Skynet\u2019 Project is Launched for Internationally Pursuing Fugitives and Recovering Assets\/\u56fd\u9645\u8ffd\u9003\u8ffd\u8d43\u542f\u52a8\u2018\u5929\u7f51\u2019\u884c\u52a8,\u201d Xinhua Net<\/em>, 27 March 2015, <http:\/\/www.xinhuanet.com\/\/politics\/2015-03\/27\/c_1114778437.htm&gt<\/a>; accessed 28 May 2021. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              41. See \u201cMinistry of Public Security Deploys a Special Combat \u2018Operation Fox Hunt 2015\u2019\/\u516c\u5b89\u90e8\u90e8\u7f72\u201c\u730e\u72d02015\u201d\u4e13\u9879\u884c\u52a8,\u201d CPC News<\/em>, 31 March 2015 < http:\/\/fanfu.people.com.cn\/n\/2015\/0331\/c64371-26779423.html<\/a> > accessed 31 April 2021. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              42. See Zhang Yan et al., \u201cHundreds of Fugitives Return to Face Trial,\u201d China Daily<\/em>, 25 January 2019, <http:\/\/www.chinadaily.com.cn\/global\/2019-01\/25\/content_37431487.htm<\/a> > accessed 30 April 2021. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              43. See Chai Yaxin\/\u67f4\u96c5\u6b23, \u201cCarry out the Skynet Campaign to Further Specific Cases\/\u5f00\u5c55\u5929\u7f51\u884c\u52a8 \u63a8\u8fdb\u4e2a\u6848\u653b\u575a,\u201d CCDI<\/em>, 7 August 2020 <http:\/\/www.ccdi.gov.cn\/special\/ztzz\/ztzzjxs_ztzz\/202008\/t20200807_223405.html<\/a> > accessed 30 April 2021. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              44. This part only discusses the facts that the TIA system was finally adopted, and the reasons for the adoption will be discussed in the following section. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              45. \u201c\u4e0d\u7ba1\u8150\u8d25\u5206\u5b50\u9003\u5230\u54ea\u91cc\uff0c\u90fd\u8981\u7f09\u62ff\u5f52\u6848\u3001\u7ef3\u4e4b\u4ee5\u6cd5\u3002\u201d See Xi Jinping, \u201cReport at the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party\/\u5728\u4e2d\u56fd\u5171\u4ea7\u515a\u7b2c\u5341\u4e5d\u6b21\u5168\u56fd\u4ee3\u8868\u5927\u4f1a\u4e0a\u7684\u62a5\u544a,\u201d People\u2019s Daily<\/em>, 19 October 2017 at 1-4. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              46. See, for example, Deng Siqing\/\u9093\u601d\u6e05, \u201cA Research on the Criminal Trial-in-Absentia System\/\u5211\u4e8b\u7f3a\u5e2d\u5ba1\u5224\u5236\u5ea6\u7814\u7a76,\u201d 3 Law Science\/\u6cd5\u5b66 92 (2007). \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              47. See, for example, He Ping\/\u4f55\u840d, \u201cCriminal Jurisdiction over Foreign Enterprise Crimes Concerning China, and on the Construction of a Criminal Trial-in-Absentia System\/\u5916\u56fd\u516c\u53f8\u6d89\u534e\u72af\u7f6a\u7684\u5211\u4e8b\u7ba1\u8f96\u2014\u2014\u517c\u8c08\u5211\u4e8b\u7f3a\u5e2d\u5ba1\u5224\u5236\u5ea6\u7684\u6784\u5efa,\u201d 3 Law Science\/\u6cd5\u5b66 153 (2015). \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              48. See, for example, Peng Xinlin\/\u5f6d\u65b0\u6797, \u201cOn the Construction of a Trial-in-Absentia System against Corruption Crimes\/\u8150\u8d25\u72af\u7f6a\u7f3a\u5e2d\u5ba1\u5224\u5236\u5ea6\u4e4b\u6784\u5efa,\u201d 12 Law Science\/\u6cd5\u5b66 58 (2016). \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              49. See, for example, Qian Wenjia\/\u94b1\u6587\u6770, \u201cThe Default Trial of Criminal Justice in China: Observation and think of special confiscation procedure\/\u6211\u56fd\u5211\u4e8b\u53f8\u6cd5\u4e2d\u7684\u7f3a\u5e2d\u5ba1\u5224\u2014\u2014\u57fa\u4e8e\u5f62\u5f0f\u8bc9\u8bbc\u7279\u522b\u6ca1\u6536\u7a0b\u5e8f\u7684\u89c2\u5bdf\u4e0e\u601d\u8003,\u201d 36(4) Hebei Law Science\/\u6cb3\u5317\u6cd5\u5b66 141 (2018). \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              50. See Zhang Jun\/\u5f20\u519b, \u201cWorking Report of the Supreme People\u2019s Procuratorate\/\u6700\u9ad8\u4eba\u6c11\u68c0\u5bdf\u9662\u5de5\u4f5c\u62a5\u544a,\u201d SPP<\/em>, 8 March 2015, <https:\/\/www.spp.gov.cn\/spp\/gzbg\/202103\/t20210315_512731.shtml&gt<\/a>; accessed 8 April 2021. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              51. See \u201cRegulations on the Jurisdiction of the National Supervisory Commission (For Trial Use)\/\u56fd\u5bb6\u76d1\u5bdf\u59d4\u5458\u4f1a\u7ba1\u8f96\u89c4\u5b9a\uff08\u8bd5\u884c\uff09,\u201d Guo Jian Fa [2018] No. 1\/\u56fd\u76d1\u53d1\u30142018\u30151\u53f7, 16 April 2018, Art. 12. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              52. These are basic descriptions of these 8 types of crimes, and there are detailed rules stipulating the threshold of these crimes. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              53. The crimes of accepting bribes have different forms, such as accepting bribes as a unit and accepting bribes based on influence over state officials. For clarity of this article, they are merged to one crime type, and the same considerations apply to other crimes. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              54. This is a catch-all provision and is yet not clearly defined. See \u201cInterpretation of the Supervision Law: Art. 15 of Section 3 Supervisory Scope and Jurisdiction\/\u300a\u4e2d\u534e\u4eba\u6c11\u5171\u548c\u56fd\u76d1\u5bdf\u6cd5\u300b\u91ca\u4e49:\u7b2c\u4e09\u7ae0\u76d1\u5bdf\u8303\u56f4\u548c\u7ba1\u8f96\u7b2c\u5341\u4e94\u6761\u201d, CCDI<\/em>, 9 April 2018, <https:\/\/www.ccdi.gov.cn\/djfg\/fgsy\/201804\/t20180409_169519.html&gt<\/a>; accessed 6 May 2021. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              55. \u201cSupervision Law of the People\u2019s Republic of China\/\u4e2d\u534e\u4eba\u6c11\u5171\u548c\u56fd\u76d1\u5bdf\u6cd5,\u201d 20 March 2018, Art. 45. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              56. See Chen Ruihua\/\u9648\u745e\u534e, \u201cThe Relationship between Subjective and Objective Factors in Criminal Standards of Proof\/\u5211\u4e8b\u8bc1\u660e\u6807\u51c6\u4e2d\u4e3b\u5ba2\u89c2\u8981\u7d20\u7684\u5173\u7cfb,\u201d 3 China Legal Science\/\u4e2d\u56fd\u6cd5\u5b66 177 (2014). \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              57. See \u201cProvisions on the Procedures of Public Security Bureaus on Handling Criminal Cases\/\u516c\u5b89\u673a\u5173\u529e\u7406\u5211\u4e8b\u6848\u4ef6\u7a0b\u5e8f\u89c4\u5b9a,\u201d PRC MPS Decree No. 159\/\u4e2d\u534e\u4eba\u6c11\u5171\u548c\u56fd\u516c\u5b89\u90e8\u4ee4\u7b2c159\u53f7, revised 20 July 2020, Art. 70. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              58. Generally speaking, a supervision case is usually dealt by a local (district or county) supervisory commission, but the jurisdictions can be changed given specific conditions, such as when the superior supervisory commission deems it necessary considering the importance and complexity of the case. See Supervision Law Arts. 16 and 17, and Supervision Measure Draft Arts. 45-53. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              59. As discussed in the following sections, the former methods taken by China to pursue corrupt fugitives are mostly those among states, indicating that chasing fugitives are treated by China as a state-level matter. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              60. For ordinary corruption crimes, the case will be handled by prosecutors from a related division. However, considering there are no detailed rules regarding the TIA system on the prosecution side, it is unclear whether a TIA case will be handled by a specific prosecutor or not. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              61. There is a reporting requirement as to trial-in-absentia proceedings against cases concerning national security and terrorism, but there are no such requirements as to the TIA proceedings against corrupt fugitives. Considering the topic of this article is unrelated to the two kinds of cases involving report requirements, this article states that the TIA system discussed in this article does not concern reporting requirements in the prosecution phase. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              62. See Zhou Changjun\/\u5468\u957f\u519b, \u201cThe Applicable Conditions of Trial by Default for Defendants Fleeing the Country in Legal Dogmatics Angle\/\u5916\u9003\u4eba\u5458\u7f3a\u5e2d\u5ba1\u5224\u9002\u7528\u6761\u4ef6\u7684\u6cd5\u6559\u4e49\u5b66\u5206\u6790,\u201d 40(8) China Law Magazine\/\u6cd5\u5b66\u6742\u5fd7 1 (2019). \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              63. See Prosecution Rules of Procedure<\/em> Arts. 505-511, and Criminal Procedure Law<\/em> Arts. 291-297. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              64. See Zhao Bingzhi\/\u8d75\u79c9\u5fd7 and Zhang Lei\/\u5f20\u78ca, \u201cScientific Positioning and Implementation of Xi Jinping\u2019s Anti-Corruption Thoughts\/\u4e60\u8fd1\u5e73\u53cd\u8150\u8d25\u8ffd\u9003\u8ffd\u8d43\u601d\u60f3\u7684\u79d1\u5b66\u5b9a\u4f4d\u4e0e\u8d2f\u5f7b\u6267\u884c,\u201d 58(2) Journal of Henan University (Social Science)\/\u6cb3\u5357\u5927\u5b66\u5b66\u62a5\uff08\u793e\u4f1a\u79d1\u5b66\u7248\uff09 37 (2018). \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              65. See Peng Xinlin\/\u5f6d\u65b0\u6797, \u201cOn the Construction of a Trial-in-Absentia System against Corruption Crimes\/\u8150\u8d25\u72af\u7f6a\u7f3a\u5e2d\u5ba1\u5224\u5236\u5ea6\u4e4b\u6784\u5efa,\u201d 12 Law Science\/\u6cd5\u5b66 58 (2016). \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              66. See \u201cWorking Rules of the Procuratorial Committees of the People\u2019s Procuratorates\/\u4eba\u6c11\u68c0\u5bdf\u9662\u68c0\u5bdf\u59d4\u5458\u4f1a\u5de5\u4f5c\u89c4\u5219,\u201d Gao Jian Fa Shi Zi [2020] No. 3\/\u9ad8\u68c0\u53d1\u91ca\u5b57\u30142020\u30153\u53f7, 31 July 2020 Art. 4. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              67. The category is not decided by the authority but by this article for convenience. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              68. For an advocate\u2019s rights in ordinary cases, please see Criminal Procedure Law<\/em> Arts. 33-49. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              69. See Criminal Procedure Law<\/em> Art. 16. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              70. See The Case of the S.S. \u201cLotus\u201d (French v Turkey)<\/em> [1927] PCIJ Ser A No 10, p.18-19. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              71. See Peng Xinlin\/\u5f6d\u65b0\u6797, \u201cThe Challenges and Countermeasures of China\u2019s Anti-Corruption Fugitive Repatriation and Illegal Income Recovery\/\u6211\u56fd\u53cd\u8150\u8d25\u56fd\u9645\u8ffd\u9003\u8ffd\u8d43\u9762\u4e34\u7684\u6311\u6218\u4e0e\u5bf9\u7b56,\u201d 39(9) Jiangxi Social Science\/\u6c5f\u897f\u793e\u4f1a\u79d1\u5b66 151 (2019). \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              72. The reason why China introduced the TIA system was vaguely stated as to strengthen pursuing corrupt fugitives. See Shen Chunyao\/\u6c88\u6625\u8000, \u201cExplanation Concerning the Revision Draft for the Criminal Procedure Law of the People\u2019s Republic of China\/\u5173\u4e8e\u300a\u4e2d\u534e\u4eba\u6c11\u5171\u548c\u56fd\u5211\u4e8b\u8bc9\u8bbc\u6cd5\uff08\u4fee\u6b63\u8349\u6848\uff09\u300b\u7684\u8bf4\u660e,\u201d NPC<\/em>, 26 October 2018 <http:\/\/www.npc.gov.cn\/zgrdw\/npc\/xinwen\/2018-10\/26\/content_2064462.htm&gt<\/a>; accessed 20 June 2021. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              73. See Li Yongzhong\/\u674e\u6c38\u5fe0, \u201cOpen up the \u2018Second Battlefield\u2019 of Anti-Corruption Overseas\/\u5f00\u8f9f\u6d77\u5916\u53cd\u8150\u7684\u2018\u7b2c\u4e8c\u6218\u573a\u2019,\u201d People\u2019s Daily<\/em>, 24 April 2015, at 5. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              74. See \u201cAnnouncement of the National Supervisory Commission, the Supreme People’s Court, and the Supreme People\u2019s Procuratorate and Other Departments on the Urging Duty-Related Criminals Who Have Escaped Overseas to Surrender Themselves\/\u56fd\u5bb6\u76d1\u5bdf\u59d4\u5458\u4f1a\u3001\u6700\u9ad8\u4eba\u6c11\u6cd5\u9662\u3001\u6700\u9ad8\u4eba\u6c11\u68c0\u5bdf\u9662\u3001\u516c\u5b89\u90e8\u3001\u5916\u4ea4\u90e8\u5173\u4e8e\u6566\u4fc3\u804c\u52a1\u72af\u7f6a\u6848\u4ef6\u5883\u5916\u5728\u9003\u4eba\u5458\u6295\u6848\u81ea\u9996\u7684\u516c\u544a,\u201d 23 August 2018. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              75. The Chinese government did not make clear statements on the defects of these two approaches. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              76. See Wang Xiumei\/\u738b\u79c0\u6885 and Zhu Beini\/\u6731\u8d1d\u59ae, \u201cExtraterritorial Prosecution to Fugitives and Asset Recovery in Fighting against Corruption\/\u53cd\u8150\u8d25\u8ffd\u9003\u8ffd\u8d43\u57df\u5916\u8ffd\u8bc9\u63a2\u8ba8,\u201d 40(4) Law Science Magazine\/\u6cd5\u5b66\u6742\u5fd7 57 (2019). \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              77. See \u201cHuang Yurong, No. 4 Suspect of the \u2018100 Red Warrants\u2019, Surrendered from the United States\/\u2018\u767e\u540d\u7ea2\u901a\u20194\u53f7\u5acc\u72af\u9ec4\u7389\u8363 \u4ece\u7f8e\u56fd\u56de\u56fd\u6295\u6848\u81ea\u9996,\u201d CCDI<\/em>, 5 December 2015 <https:\/\/www.ccdi.gov.cn\/special\/ztzz\/ztzzjxs_ztzz\/201512\/t20151207_69737.html&gt<\/a>; accessed 23 May 2021. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              78. See Christopher et al. (eds.), The Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation: A Comparative Perspective<\/em> (CH Beck Hart, 2010) 5. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              79. See \u201cNine Individuals Charged in Superseding Indictment with Conspiring to Act as Illegal Agents of the People\u2019s Republic of China,\u201d US DOJ<\/em>, 22 July 2021 <https:\/\/www.justice.gov\/opa\/pr\/nine-individuals-charged-superseding-indictment-conspiring-act-illegal-agents-people-s&gt<\/a>; accessed 24 July 2021. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              80. United Nations Convention against Corruption (adopted 31 October 2003, entered into force 14 December 2005) 2349 UNTS 41 (UNCAC). \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              81. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (adopted 15 November 2000, entered into force 29 September 2003) 2225 UNTS 209 (UNTOC). \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              82. See UNCAC art 33. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              83. See Cecily Rose et al. (eds), The United Nations Convention Against Corruption: A Commentary<\/em> (Oxford University Press, 2019) 433. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              84. See Yuan Jiangping\/\u8881\u6c5f\u5e73 and Ou Fuyong\/\u6b27\u798f\u6c38, \u201cOn the Basis of International Law for the Legal Mechanism of International Cooperation in the Pursuit of Fugitives and Recovery of Stolen Assets Outside China\/\u8bba\u4e2d\u56fd\u5883\u5916\u8ffd\u9003\u8ffd\u8d43\u56fd\u9645\u5408\u4f5c\u6cd5\u5f8b\u673a\u5236\u7684\u56fd\u9645\u6cd5\u4f9d\u636e,\u201d 27(4) Journal of Shanghai University of International Business and Economics\/\u4e0a\u6d77\u5bf9\u5916\u7ecf\u8d38\u5927\u5b66\u5b66\u62a5 77 (2020). \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              85. See David McClean, Transnational Organized Crime: A Commentary on the UN Convention and its Protocols<\/em> (Oxford University Press, 2007) 179-180. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              86. See Zhang Weiran\/\u5f20\u851a\u7136, \u201cChina Has Reached 59 Extradition Treaties with Foreign Jurisdictions\/\u4e2d\u56fd\u5df2\u5bf9\u5916\u7f14\u7ed359\u9879\u5f15\u6e21\u6761\u7ea6,\u201d China News<\/em>, 26 October 2020 <http:\/\/www.chinanews.com\/gn\/2020\/10-26\/9322780.shtml&gt<\/a>; accessed 28 May 2021. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              87. See Jiangnan Zhu, Out of China\u2019s Reach: Globalized Corruption Fugitives<\/em>, 86 The China Journal 90 (2021). \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              88. See \u201cTop Three Hiding Places for Chinese Corrupt Fugitives: Easy to be Naturalized and Escape\/\u4e2d\u56fd\u5916\u9003\u8d2a\u5b98\u4e09\u5927\u85cf\u533f\u5730\uff1a\u79fb\u6c11\u65b9\u4fbf\u6613\u8131\u8eab,\u201d People.cn<\/em>, 22 October 2014 <http:\/\/world.people.com.cn\/n\/2014\/1022\/c1002-25886733.html>accessed<\/a> 1 June 2021. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              89. Ma Decai\/\u9a6c\u5fb7\u624d, \u201cUnited Nations Convention against Corruption and Improvement of China\u2019s Extradition Law\/\u300a\u8054\u5408\u56fd\u53cd\u8150\u8d25\u516c\u7ea6\u300b\u4e0e\u6211\u56fd\u300a\u5f15\u6e21\u6cd5\u300b\u7684\u5b8c\u5584,\u201d 35(5) Jiangxi Social Science\/\u6c5f\u897f\u793e\u4f1a\u79d1\u5b66 5 (2015). \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              90. See The Case of the S.S. \u201cLotus\u201d (French v Turkey)<\/em> [1927] PCIJ Ser A No 10, p.18-19. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              91. Under the TIA system, the service of process may also require international cooperation, but considering this topic is beyond the merits of this article\u2019s discussion, this article omits the service of process. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              92. See UNCAC art 57. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              93. Amal Clooney and Philippa Webb, The Right to a Fair Trial in International Law <\/em>(Oxford University Press, 2021) 447-48. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              94. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III) art 10. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              95. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 14.3(d) \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              96. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 20 March 1952, entered into force 18 May 1954) 213 UNTS 221 art 6(3)(c). \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              97. China signed but has not approved the ICCPR, making it not a party to the ICCPR. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331 art 14 \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              98. ICCPR art 14.3(d). \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              99. For example, see Mbenge v Zaire Comm<\/em> No 16\/ 1977 (25 March 1983) para 14.2. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              100. See Caleb H. Wheeler, The Right to Be Present at Trial in International Law<\/em> (Brill, 2019) 30. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              101. Poitrimol v France<\/em> (1994) 18 EHRR 130, 23 November 1993, para 35. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              102. See Caleb H. Wheeler, The Right to Be Present at Trial in International Law<\/em> (Brill, 2019) 105-106. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              103. See Sarah Joseph and Melissa Catan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials, and Commentary<\/em> (Oxford University Press, 3rd edn, 2013) 489-491. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              104. Mbenge v Zaire Comm<\/em> No 16\/ 1977 (25 March 1983) para 14.1. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              105. Mbenge v Zaire Comm<\/em> No 16\/ 1977 (25 March 1983) para 14.1. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              106. Maleki v Italy No 699\/1996 (15 July 1999) para 9.5. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              107. See William A. Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary<\/em> (Oxford University Press, 2015) 316. \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n
                              108. See Anne Peters, Corruption as a Violation of International Human Rights<\/em>, 29(4) European Journal of International Law 1251 (2018). \u2191<\/a><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

                                \u00a0Ms. Yang Xiuzhu in the dock Chen Liang (\u9648\u9753)[1] Table of Contents Abstract I. Introduction II. Background of the TIA System A. National Policies against General Corruption 1. Starting Point in Late 2012 2. Evolving Campaign by 2018 3. New System since 2018 B. Political Incentives on Chasing Corrupt Fugitives 1. Starting from 2014 2. … Continue reading Pursuing Corrupt Fugitives: On China\u2019s Trial-in-Absentia System<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":15,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"advanced_seo_description":"","jetpack_seo_html_title":"","jetpack_seo_noindex":false,"jetpack_seo_schema_type":"","_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_wpcom_ai_launchpad_first_post":false,"_jetpack_feature_clip_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":false,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2},"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[86,88,87,84,92],"tags":[108,107,109,106],"class_list":["post-1622","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-antibribery-law","category-bribery","category-corruption","category-criminal-law","category-stl-student-notes","tag-anti-corruption-campaign-in-china","tag-corrupt-fugitives","tag-right-to-be-present","tag-trial-in-absentia"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/pgBdw4-qa","jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/stllawreviewblog.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1622","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/stllawreviewblog.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/stllawreviewblog.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/stllawreviewblog.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/15"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/stllawreviewblog.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1622"}],"version-history":[{"count":25,"href":"https:\/\/stllawreviewblog.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1622\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1761,"href":"https:\/\/stllawreviewblog.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1622\/revisions\/1761"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/stllawreviewblog.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1622"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/stllawreviewblog.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1622"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/stllawreviewblog.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1622"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}